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NOTES

"PUT YOUR BODY ON THE LINE:" CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE AND INJUNCTIONS
INTRODUCTION

The issue of abortion is one of the most divisive facing
American society today. Both sides include among their ranks
people almost fanatically devoted to views that are themselves
diametrically opposed: the supporters of unrestricted abortion
see the question as one that cuts to the heart of women's
rights and bodily autonomy. Those who support restrictions on
or criminalization of abortion see the question as one of life
and death.
It is no wonder that in the context of this heated and
seemingly unresolvable issue, civil disobedience has taken on
renewed prominence as a form of political expression. The
opponents of abortion have been using civil disobedience for
several years to blockade health care clinics that provide,
among other services, abortions. More recently, supporters of
abortion rights have begun using civil disobedience symbolically to register their disapproval of Supreme Court and other
political decisions regarding abortion by staging sit-ins and
other demonstrations. At first glance, it would seem that the
two groups engage in the same kind of civil disobedience and,
thus, that they should be treated equivalently. As both a matter of law and policy, however, the two kinds of protest are
different. This Note examines examples of civil disobedience
from each camp and considers why and how the two should be
distinguished.
In 1987, disruptions took place throughout the New York
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area when Operation Rescue, a national pro-life1 group, blockaded health care clinics by sitting down in front of the clinic
doors, effectively closing the facilities down.2 Hundreds of people gathered in the chilly dawn, praying, chanting, waving
rosaries and sprinkling holy water. Police came out in force,
arresting the protesters and trying to separate screaming prolifers from screaming pro-choicers, who escorted nervous clients into the clinic. These acts of civil disobedience were part
of Operation Rescue's on-going national campaign to stop women from having abortions.
On July 2, 1992, a group of pro-choice activists sat down in
front of the Holland Tunnel, effectively closing down both the
Tunnel and surrounding streets for approximately one hour.3
Horns blared and police lined the streets two deep on all sides.
Legal observers-volunteers who are trained to keep track of
arrests and police behavior-ran after people being arrested
while the arrestees screamed their names and affinity groups.
Supporters of the protestors crowded around the police, shouting "no choice, no peace." This act of civil disobedience arose in
protest of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,4 which severely restricted a woman's

1 This Note will use the term "pro-choice" to describe those in favor of a
woman's right to have an abortion and the term "pro-life" to describe those in
favor of regulating or criminalizing abortion. The debate over terminology captures
the very essence of the debate over abortion, as the "pro-choice" side asserts that
issue is a question of choice, while the "pro-life" side sees it is a question of life.
Each side calls the other by its own label, that is the pro-choicers refer to their
opponents as "anti-choice," while the pro-lifers call their opponents "anti-life" or
"pro-abortion." Thus, this Note's choice of terms reflects the preferences of each
group.
2 Operation Rescue is a radical pro-life group. It has organized and engaged in
clinic blockades all over the country. See Nadine Brozan, 503 Held in Abortion
Protest on East 85th St., N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1988, at B1 (describing Operation
Rescue); Larry Martz, The New Pro-Life Offensive, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 1988, at
25 (same).
' The group involved in the Holland Tunnel blockade called itself an "Ad-Hoc
Coalition of Pro-Choice, AIDS, and Lesbian/Gay Activists." The names of the organizers and supporting groups involved were never known, though the Women's
Health Action Mobilization ("WHAM") was a named defendant in the injunction
that prohibited the protest. The New York City chapter of the National Lawyers
Guild and the Women's Action Coalition provided legal support and defense of the
so-called "Holland Tunnel 48" who were arrested in the demonstration. The group
is no longer in existence; it came together only to plan and carry out this action.
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Casey involved a challenge on substantive due process grounds to the constitutionality of 1988 and 1989 amendments to the Penn-
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right to obtain an abortion. In both of these situations, courts
had issued injunctions to stop the planned civil disobedience.5
This Note examines the 1987 and 1992 acts of civil disobesylvania abortion statute. In its decision, the Supreme Court held that
(1) the doctrine of stare decisis requires reaffirmance of Roe v. Wade's
essential holding recognizing a woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal viability, (2) the undue burden test, rather than the trimester
framework, should be used in evaluating abortion restrictions before viability; (3) the medical emergency definition in the Pennsylvania statute
was sufficiently broad that it did not impose an undue burden; (4) the
informed consent requirements, the 24 hour waiting period, parental
consent provision, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the
Pennsylvania statute did not impose an undue burden; and (5) the
spousal notification provision imposed an undue burden and was invalid.
Id.
Port Authority v. Women's Health Action and Mobilization a.k.a. WHAM, No.
42950/92 (1st Dep't July 2, 1992) (resulting in the injunction against the Holland
Tunnel action).
Clinics, patients and women's rights organizations have brought numerous
suits against Operation Rescue, both to recover damages and to stop the clinic
blockades. This Note refers principally to a New York case, New York State Org.
for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y.) (granting injunction against
Operation Rescue), affd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947
(1990), and a Virginia case, National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.
Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991), rev'd in
part and vacated in part, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Other cases in which injunctions
have been issued include: Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948
F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991) (on remand to determine whether issuance of injunction
is appropriate remedy); Aradia Women's Health Ctr. v. Operation Rescue, 929 F.2d
530 (9th Cir. 1991); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Lewis
v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.), reh'g granted, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993); Northeast Women's Ctr. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); Portland
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.
1988); North Virginia Women's Medical Ctr. v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir.
1980); Town of Brookline v. Operation Rescue, 762 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1991);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371 (D.
Conn. 1989); Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F. Supp. 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1989);
Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Planned Parenthood v. Wilson, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Chico Feminist Women's Health
Ctr. v. Scully, 208 Cal. App. 3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Planned Parenthood
League v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 1990); State v. Friberg, 435
N.W.2d 509 (Minn.), affd, 435 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1989); Ryan v. Moreland, 653
S.W.2d 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 91
A.D.2d 551, 457 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't 1982); OBGYN Ass'ns v. Birthright of
Brooklyn and Queens, 64 A.D.2d 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903 (2d Dep't 1978); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 1990); Dayton Women's
Health Ctr. v. Enix, 555 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047
(1991).
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dience in light of the role of injunctions and the methodology of
courts' granting them, particularly in the context of balancing
constitutional rights. This Note concludes that in the balance
of equities between the defendants' interest in freedom of political expression and plaintiffs' concern about the inadequate
legal remedy for their injuries, Operation Rescue's 1987 civil
disobedience risked causing the kind of imminent and probable
irreparable harm required for the issuance of an injunction,
while the 1992 Holland Tunnel action did not. As such, a legal
remedy would have been an insufficient response to the clinic
blockades, while it would have been an adequate response to
the Holland Tunnel blockade.' In addition, there was a strong
governmental interest in enjoining the Operation Rescue actions, while there was no comparably strong governmental
interest in preventing the Holland Tunnel action from going
forward. As a result, the courts properly issued injunctions
against Operation Rescue but improperly against the Holland
Tunnel action.!
Part I of this Note considers the role of civil disobedience
in American life, the definition and purpose of an injunction
and the relationship of the First Amendment to both civil disobedience and injunctions. Part II then examines the elements
that determine whether and when injunctions should be issued. Next, Part III balances the defendants' and plaintiffs'
6 A legal remedy or remedy at law is an award of money damages to com-

pensate for a lost interest. An equitable remedy is one that requires a defendant
to perform or refrain from performing a certain act either to restore plaintiff to
her situation before the lawsuit, or to prevent her from suffering further harm at
the hands of that defendant.
' The injunction issued against the Holland Tunnel action was preliminary,
while that against Operation Rescue was permanent. For the purposes of this
Note, both will be considered permanent injunctions.
For an in-depth analysis of the procedural and substantive differences between the two types of orders, see 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2941-46 (1973). Briefly, preliminary injunctions and permanent injunctions are similar in their effect
since they require a party either to do or to refrain from doing some act.
However, they differ in that [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65] specifies
preliminary injunctions and the
special procedural requirements for ...
A
timing, as well as the duration, of each of the . . . orders varies ....
preliminary injunction is effective pendente lite until a decision has been
reached at a trial on the merits. A permanent injunction will issue only
after a right thereto has been established at a trial on the merits.
11 id. § 2941, at 361.
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interests in the Operation Rescue and Holland Tunnel acts.
Finally, Part IV examines the governmental interest implicated by these two situations and seeks to balance competing
constitutional rights-the right to political protest against the
right to travel and the right to have an abortion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Civil Disobedience and American Political Culture
Civil disobedience 8 has been part of the American political
culture since before the American Revolution It may be argued, in fact, that American political, social and ethical attitudes encourage civil disobedience, and that democracy itself
spawns this particular form of protest. As stated by Ronald
Dworkin,
Civil disobedience is a feature of our political experience, not because some people are virtuous and other wicked, or because some
have a monopoly of wisdom and others of ignorance. But because we
disagree, sometimes profoundly, in the way independent people with
a lively sense of justice will disagree about very serious issues of
political morality and strategy."

Other societies have looked to American intellectuals to ex-

' Black's Law Dictionary defines civil disobedience as "a form of lawbreaking
employed to demonstrate the injustice or unfairness of a particular law and indulged in deliberately to focus attention on the allegedly undesirable law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 245 (6th ed. 1990). For the purposes of this Note, civil disobedience is illegal nonviolent expressive conduct practiced in an open, non-secretive
way by people who are prepared to accept the consequences of their illegal actions.
The most common kind of civil disobedience today-and the civil disobedience
engaged in by the two defendants under consideration in this Note-is the sit-in,
as practiced, for example, by the civil rights activists who sat in at Woolworth
lunchcounters, or by AIDS activists who sit in at the National Institutes of
Health. See Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67 (1990).
9 It is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the history of civil disobedience.

For a thorough discussion of the history and role of civil disobedience in American
political culture, see DAVID R. WEBER, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA (1978). See
also LYNN BUZZARD & PAULA CAMPBELL, HOLY DISOBEDIENCE 14 (1984); HENRY D.
THOREAU: PEOPLE, PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS 35 (Milton Meltzer ed., 1963).
10 RONALD DWOREIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 105-06 (1985); see also Harrop A.
Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 813 (1958)
("ITlhe Judeo-Christian religion has always maintained the duty to obey God
speaking through conscience as superior to any civil law.").
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plain civil disobedience, recognizing that "civil disobedience has
been much canvassed in... the Anglo-American tradition,"'
and asking Americans to "describe the shape the discussion
has taken in Britain and the United States."12
Largely because of this organic tradition of protest Americans of
today accept that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place
in the political culture of their community. Few Americans now
either deplore or regret the civil rights and antiwar movements of
the 1960s. People in the center as well as on the left of politics give
the most famous occasions of civil disobedience a good press, at least
in retrospect. They concede that these acts did engage the collective
moral sense of the community. Civil disobedience is no longer a
frightening idea in the United States."'

Rather, Americans recognize that their civilly disobedient
predecessors, far from being outlaws to be reviled, instead
"make up a rich national heritage of conscientious dissent,"
very much in keeping with the principles on which the nation
was founded. 4
A brief examination of American civil disobedience suggests three general traditions of protest. 5 The first consisted
of struggles for religious liberty in the American colonies. In
the mid-seventeenth century, for example, Quakers and Baptists in the Massachusetts Bay Colony refused to comply with
the legal requirement to choose and support a Congregational
minister. These dissenters were hanged and whipped, but the
dissidents "doth absolutely refuse to do what the law in that
case Requires." 6 A century later, Isaac Backus preached and
engaged in civil disobedience in the form of withholding religious taxes to force a separation of church and state, and to
bring about legislation that would protect the religious pracn DwORKIN, supra note 10, at 104 ("This discussion of civil disobedience was
prepared for a conference on the subject organized by the Social Democratic Party
of Germany. . . . The idea is a new one for most German audiences.").
12

Id.

" Id. at 105; see also Ledewitz, supra note 8, at 68 ("[Clivil disobedience . . .
has become an established part of American political life. Certainly since the
1960's, but even before then, many groups seeking political reform have used civil
disobedience either as a tactic to bring their message to the attention of the public or as an expression of non-cooperation with policies they oppose.").
14 WEBER, supra note 9, at 11.
11 WEBER, supra note 9.
14 1 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 169 (1971).
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tices of New England Baptists. 7 "American civil disobedience
begins, then, with resistance to specifically religious persecution or harassment, rather than with opposition to injustice
conceived in broader or more secular terms."'8
The next phase of civil disobedience can be described as
one in which individuals refused to obey laws that they considered immoral. The most famous practitioner of the mid-nineteenth century civil disobedience was Henry David Thoreau,
and the most common target was slavery. In particular, the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, which made it a crime for Northerners to help escaped slaves avoid the slavecatchers, spawned
a generation of civil disobedience: "many people violated that
law because their consciences would not permit them to obey
19
it."'
Finally, the twentieth century saw the rise of mass civil
disobedience as a tactic to achieve social or legal change. This
civil disobedience has "tended to be inspired less by a vision of
individual innocence maintained in opposition to state decree
than by a determination to influence the state and society
both-either to restrain them from doing evil or to lead them
into a process of active regeneration." ° These protests
targeted the segregated armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s,
the unequal treatment of women at the turn of the century
and in the 1970s, Jim Crow laws in the 1960s, U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s and in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s, and the nuclear arms race. The
civil disobedience of this era "forced everyone to look at what
the majority could no longer, for a variety of reasons, ignore."2 ' This is the sort of civil disobedience in which both
sides of the abortion debate have engaged in the past decade.
As revealed in this brief examination, "the advocates of
civil disobedience in our history have been numerous, influential, and extraordinarily varied-in their group identities, their
professions, their religious affiliations, their values and objectives."22 This "wise minority," to borrow Henry David

W
WEBER, supra note 9,
, Id. at 20.
19DWORKIN, supra note
WEBER, supra note 9,
21 DWORKIN, supra note

at 49.
10, at 104.
at 27.
10, at 110.

WEBER, supra note 9, at 11.
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Thoreau's characterization of himself and fellow disobedients,
has usually been a small percentage of the population, but it
has been a "felt presence in American thought and life out of
all proportion to its numbers."23 By virtue of that presence,
civil disobedience has raised issues that have "become a characteristic and revealing part of American intellectual and moral experience."24
B. Injunctions
An injunction is a drastic remedy that should issue only in
extraordinary circumstances.25 It is an equitable order "consisting of a command by the court.., that the party to whom
it is directed do, or refrain from doing, some specified act.""
As such, it has the unique dual purpose of "prevent[ing] a
wrong from occurring in the future,"27 and "allow[ing] plaintiff
to enjoy her substantive rights."" Thus, when a court issues
an injunction rather than allowing defendants to engage in the
behavior and be punished after the fact, it effectively converts
a civil suit for damages into "a personalized criminal statute,"29 thereby subjecting the defendant to the risk of criminal
2
24

Id.

at 18.

Id.
' See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2942, at 364-70.

26 McQueen v. Lustine Realty Co., 547 A.2d 172, 176 (D.C. 1988); see also

United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483, 486 (3d Cir. 1969) ('An injunction
is a prohibitive writ issued by a court of equity forbidding a party-defendant from
certain action"); Inhabitants of Town of Lincolnville v. Perry, 104 A.2d 884, 887
(Me. 1954) ("An injunction has been well described as a judicial process whereby a
party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular thing."); Cutten v.
Latshaw, 344 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) ("An injunction is a writ
framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the
court regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good conscience.' (quoting 43 C.J.S., Injunctions § 1, at 405)).
27 OWEN M. FIss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8 (1978). Fiss's thesis in this
treatise is that an injunction, although unique, should not be "disfavored as a
remedy" and, thus, "subject to restrictions not applied to other remedies." Id. at 6.
Fiss urges that the traditional view of the injunction as a drastic tool of equity, to
be used only in extraordinary circumstances, should "give way to a nonhierarchical
conception of remedies, where there is no presumptive remedy, but rather a context-specific evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each form of relief."
Id. Though an interesting viewpoint, this is not one courts generally have adopted.
For the purposes of this Note, then, an injunction ,is appropriate only in the absence of an adequate legal remedy.
28 OWEN FIss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 59 (2d ed. 1984).
29 Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunc-
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contempt beyond civil penalties. Because of the extreme nature
of this tool of equity, courts are stringent about granting injunctions. And although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
provides some guidelines for plaintiffs who seek preliminary
injunctive relief and temporary restraining orders," that rule
is merely procedural and does not offer "a comprehensive or
detailed ... framework for seeking injunctive relief."3 ' Therefore, it is up to courts to determine if and when they should
issue an injunction.
Courts make the determination to grant injunctions by
engaging in a practice alternatively labelled "balancing equities" or "balancing hardships." As Chief Justice Burger noted,
"[iln equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes and
look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests."3 2 In doing so,
courts take a number of steps. First, they consider whether the
defendant has any overriding interests that require that the
contested action go forward. Next, courts assess the risk that
without the injunction, the illegal act would be likely to cause
damage such that the traditional legal remedy would be inadequate to compensate the plaintiff." The court then balances
tion, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 358 (1981).
=' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Preliminary Injunction
(1)Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to
the adverse party.
(2) Consolidation of Hearing with Trial on Merits. Before or after the
commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application.
(b) Temporary Restraining Order.... A temporary restraining order may
be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or that
party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by
affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
31 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2941, at 362.
12 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973). This case involved payments
to church-related schools under the non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act for services performed or costs incurred. The Supreme Court determined
that permitting payment of allocated funds for the school year would not substantially undermine the constitutional interest at stake, while denial of payment
would have serious financial consequences on private schools that relied on state's
agreement. The Court held, therefore, that funds allocated to reimburse non-public
schools for services rendered during the school year could be paid. Id. at 192-93.
" Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Considering the question of when the
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the equities between the party seeking the injunction and the
party seeking to perform the act to determine whether it would
be harder for the defendant to live with the injunction than for
the plaintiff to live without it.34 After performing this balancing, a court may consider any government interests implicated
by the contested behavior or by the proposed injunction. If a
policy
court deems those interests to be important, the public
35
other.
the
or
way
one
scale
the
tip
may
considerations
C. Injunctions, Civil Disobedience and the FirstAmendment36
An injunction as a remedial tool stops contested activity
before it happens, rather than punishing the actors after the

federal government should interfere with state court actions, this case stands for
the basic proposition that where state criminal proceedings are involved, federal
courts should be reluctant to interfere. Thus, the Supreme Court denied an injunction, the main purpose of which was to prevent the enforcement of a state criminal statute. Id. at 53-54; see Foreword, Younger v. Harris-Limitation on the Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin State Criminal Prosecutions-Two Views, 1972 UTAH
L. REV. 1. On the other hand, where exceptional circumstances create a threat of
great and immediate irreparable injury, federal injunctive action against a state
criminal statute may be warranted. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965).

", See Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union, 471
F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972) ("The fatal defect[] in the decision of the District Court
[to grant an injunction] w[as] ... its failure to weigh the equities between the
parties and to determine whether the . .. [defendant] would suffer more from the
granting of the injunction than the . . . [plaintiff] from its denial.").

Courts also have considered various defenses against issuance of an injunction, even if the plaintiff has met all the standards for such relief. Generally, a
court may be reluctant to grant equitable relief of any kind if the plaintiff/movant
has acted in bad faith in bringing the transaction before the court. This defense
stems from the maxim "he who comes into equity must enter with clean hands."
11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2946, at 413. Similarly, "equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber in their rights." Id. at 417. Thus, a movant who
is guilty of laches-who has not moved quickly to assert her rights-may not be
granted equitable relief. Neither of these defenses provide an absolute bar on the
court's granting equitable relief; rather, they are additional factors a court might
weigh to determine whether to issue an injunction. See generally id. at 411-22.
5 This Note seeks to perform that balancing in the context of civil disobedience to provide some guidelines for future consideration of whether to enjoin particular acts of civil disobedience. See infra Part III.
"6 The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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fact. As a preemptive measure, an injunction of political protest is a prior restraint on speech.17 In Nebraska PressAssociation v. Stuart, the Supreme Court invalidated a judicial decree that prohibited the press from reporting or broadcasting
accounts of a controversial criminal trial.38 The Court noted
that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." 9 As a result, the Supreme Court has found prior restraints on speech constitutionally permissible only in
"exceptional cases." 0 In Near v. Minnesota, for example, the
Court held unconstitutional an injunction against the publication of a newspaper that had engaged in repeated anti-semitic
references to the mayor and police commissioner.4 In addition
to these references, statements in the newspaper threatened
violence and violence had accompanied the newspaper's publication. In holding the injunction invalid, Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for the Court, explained that the exceptional cases
justifying a prior restraint on speech include: (1) restraints
during wartime to prevent the disclosure of military. deployments or obstruction of the military effort; (2) enforcement of
obscenity laws, and (3) enforcement of laws against incitement
to acts of violence or revolution.4 2
More recently, in New York Times Co. v. United States
(commonly referred to as the Pentagon Papers case), the Supreme Court reiterated Bantam Books v. Sullivan's warning
against prior restraints.4 3 The Court held that the First
Amendment prevented enjoining the newspaper's publication of
the Pentagon Papers, despite the government's claim that such
publication would pose "'grave and irreparable' injury to the

" "[A] system of prior restraint is any scheme which '[gives] public officials the
power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression.'" Sixteenth of September Planning Comm., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 474 F. Supp. 1333,
1338 (D. Colo. 1979) (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 553 (1975)).
3 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
3' Id. at 559; see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)
("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity").
'" LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-36, at 1045 (2d
ed. 1988).
"' 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
42

Id. at 716.

- 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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public interest"" and "a serious threat to national security."45 Finally, in explaining its holding in Nebraska Press, the
Court observed that a prior restraint "has an immediate and
irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal
speech, prior reor civil sanctions after publication 'chills'
46
straint 'freezes' it at least for the time."
In order to pass constitutional muster, a prior restraint on
expressive activity must meet the standards set out by the
Court in the Pentagon Papers case 47 and reaffirmed in Nebraska Press.4 ' These cases require that a party seeking to
enjoin expressive activity prove that such activity will "surely"
or "inevitably" result "directly" and "immediately" in "irreparable" injury to the nation.4" Commenting in Nebraska Press,
Justice Brennan further suggested that "only governmental
allegation and proof that ... [the contested expressive activity]
must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence
of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order."5"
The showing must be particularly compelling where political speech is at stake. In Carrollv. Presidentand Commissioners of PrincessAnne, an injunction issued against the National
States Rights Party, a white supremacist organization, preventing the group from holding rallies or public meetings for
ten days following the injunction's issuance. 1 As a result, a
scheduled rally did not take place. The Court held that the injunctive order, having been issued ex parte, without notice to
the National States Rights Party, violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that because political expression
4' Id.
4. Id.

at 732.
at 754.
4' 427 U.S. at 559.
403 U.S. at 713.
" 427 U.S. at 539.
" Id. at 593. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's concurrence reflected
the majority rule in New York Times v. Sullivan. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
"0New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726-27. Justice Brennan's analogy to the transport at sea is a reference to Near v. Minnesota, where the Court reasoned that
"No one would question but that a government might prevent .. .the publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." 283 U.S.
at 716.
51 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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was at stake, the delay caused by a prior restraint "of even a
day or two may be of crucial importance."5 2 Short of a showing of extreme necessity, an injunction of expression would be
constitutionally impermissible.
The peculiar problem raised by this kind of injunction,
indeed, is whether it can be contested in time to engage in the
intended political protest. In Walker v. Birmingham, the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, granted a temporary
injunction against the petitioners, who had planned to participate in mass street parades and processions without a permit.53 Requests for the permit had been denied. The petitioners made no further requests for permits, nor did they challenge the injunction. Rather, they encouraged and participated
in civil rights marches conducted one and three days after they
had been notified of the injunction. They were found guilty of
contempt. Both the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed their convictions and refused to consider
their constitutional attacks on the injunction.
Walker's so-called "collateral bar" rule dictates that an
injunction cannot be violated and then challenged: although
"[tihe breadth and vagueness of the injunction itself would also
unquestionably be subject to substantial constitutional question[,] ... the [proper] way to raise that question ... [is] to
apply to the... courts to have the injunction modified or dissolved." 4 This holding, the Supreme Court explained,

2 Id.

at 182 (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964)).

For an opposing view on the danger of prior restraints of political speech, see
William T. Mayton, Toward of Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of
Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 245, 270 (1982). The author argues that subsequent punishment
"necessarily results in a significant social loss, consisting of speech that judicial

review might save," while an injunction
must first be tested by adversarial processes, with the government carrying the burden of showing the court that the requested suppression is
the narrowest possible under the circumstances, and that the circumstances warranting such suppression are urgent. The order itself can, and
must, be specific: "pinpointed" as to persons and conduct. In this way,
the cost to speech of erroneous suppression is minimized.
Id. (citations omitted). The fallacy in this reasoning is that injunctive orders themselves are often overbroad and suppress speech that should be protected by the
First Amendment. See infra note 61.
388 U.S. 307 (1967).
c'Id. at 317.
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reflects a belief that in the fair administration of justice no man can
be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irrespective of his race, color, politics or religion. This Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets.55

To maintain the integrity of the judiciary in the public's mind,
the Court forfeited the rights of protesters to challenge patently unconstitutional injunctions in time to go ahead with their
protest.5"
The effect of the doctrine of collateral bar, which remains
good law,5" is that when a court issues an injunction against a
disfavored political protest, it effectively silences that expression until after the injunction has been challenged. This is
prior restraint of speech at its most dangerous, as the government can seek injunctions against political protests as a means
of automatically preventing those protests from going forward.
It is for this reason that the balancing of equities is so impor-

5 Id. at 320-21.
'6 Compare Walker v. Birmingham with Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969), which permitted protestors to challenge a.facially unconstitutional city
ordinance worded very similarly to the state injunction at issue in Walker. The
Walker Court placed great emphasis on maintaining the integrity of the judiciary
by forcing people to obey court orders. 388 U.S. at 307. On the other hand, legislatures-being elected and representative bodies--do not require the same deference from people; thus legislative ordinances can be disregarded and later challenged, while court orders cannot.
For analysis of the legal and practical issues raised by Walker, see THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE ExPRESSION (1970); Vince Blasi, Prior Restraints
on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1482 (1970); ; Joel L. Selig, Regulation of
Street Demonstrations by Injunction: Constitutional Limitations on the Collateral
Bar Rule in Prosecutions for Contempt, 4 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 135 (1968);
Valerie Tarzign, Note, Parades and Protest Demonstrations:Punctual Judicial Review of Prior Restraints on First Amendment Liberties, 45 IND. L.J. 114 (1969);
Sheldon Teffi, Neither Above the Law Nor Below It: A Note on Walker v. Birmingham, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 181.
" In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 693 (1988), is a Rhode Island case that modifies the Walker holding: "[a]
party subject to an order that constitutes a transparently invalid prior restraint on
pure speech may challenge the order by violating it." This case is not relevant to
the situations under consideration as the injunctions in question are not, for the
sake of this argument, transparently invalid. Even if they were, moreover, there is
no argument that the contested conduct--civil disobedience-is pure speech.
For a more thorough treatment of the collateral bar doctrine, see Richard E.
Labunski, The "CollateralBar" Rule and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1988).
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tant. The injunction is essentially a control mechanism on
political expression. Based on the importance of civil disobedience as legitimate political expression, courts should be particularly reluctant to issue injunctions against political protest of
any kind without a clear showing that the equities tip against
the actors' right to political expression. At the same time, however, courts must act if such a showing is made.
II. WHEN SHOULD AN INJUNCTION BE ISSUED: BALANCING THE
EQUITIES
A. Defendants' Interest
In balancing the equities between the parties to determine
whether an injunction should issue, a court must examine the
nature and significance of the defendants' asserted interest in
engaging in the contested behavior. In both the WHAM and
the Operation Rescue cases, the defendants had an interest in
employing civil disobedience to express their political views. 5
Because any injunction inevitably will curtail free expression,
however, courts must consider very carefully the impact injunctions would have on these expressions.
Indeed, at issue in the two injunctions under consideration
is behavior that has traditionally been "widely regarded as a
legitimate form of political protest." 9 There is no question
that the conduct of the chanters, prayers, singers and screamers constituted protected speech that should not be affected by
an injunction against civil disobedience." Instead, the injunc" When assessing whether government regulation of symbolic conduct is permissible, the courts use a four-part test established in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968). The regulation is permissible if: (1) the regulation was within
the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an "important or substantial governmental interest" which is (3) "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression;" and (4) the "incidental restriction" on First Amendment freedoms is
"no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest." Id.
at 368. For practical purposes this test boils down to a rule that regulations
aimed at the message of the conduct usually are impermissible, while a regulation
aimed at the conduct itself may be permissible. With both the injunction against
WHAM and the injunctions against Operation Rescue, the government sought to
stop the conduct of the groups-the civil disobedience blockades-regardless of the
message either group sought to relay. These injunctions thus passed the O'Brien
test.
'

Ledewitz, supra note 8, at 72-73.

G0Though not "pure speech" in the sense of being spoken words with no ac-
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tions were ostensibly directed only at those engaging in the
illegal acts of sitting down in front of the clinic doors and the
Tunnel entrance.6 '
While determining whether civil disobedience should be
included as expression protected by the First Amendment is
beyond the scope of this Note,6 2 the analysis proceeds on the
presumption that both defendants had a strong interest in
political expression, and that their chosen form of political
expression was one that a significant minority of Americans

companying activity, this mixture of political speech and conduct that has great
expressive content falls squarely under the protection of the First Amendment. See
Sixteenth of September Planning Comm., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, Colo.,
474 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1979) ("While parades and marches are not as
strictly insulated from regulation as so-called 'pure speech,' they nonetheless receive significant constitutional protection as an established form of First Amendment expression.").
" Many injunctions are overbroad and do, in fact, reach these protected activities. See Amicus Brief for Appellant at 8, Trump v. Trump (1st Dep't Apr. 16,
1992) (prior restraint injunctions "suffer the danger of sweeping too broadly and of
restricting speech which may well be entitled to remain unfettered."). In fact, the
injunction originally obtained by plaintiffs in Port Authority v. WHAM was not
limited to illegal conduct. It also enjoined activities that most likely were entitled
to constitutional protection, such as advocacy. As noted in a New York Newsday
article about the Holland Tunnel action, "felven people who weren't going to the
Not only couldn't people break the law
demonstration were to be muzzled ....
and block the tunnel, but others couldn't help them with Xerox machines for the
fliers." Jim Dwyer, More Than Just a Choice, NEWSDAY, July 24, 1992, at 2. The
Port Authority has obtained similar injunctions against political speech that were
not narrowly confined to purely illegal conduct. Rather, these extended beyond the
conduct to include advocacy in such a way that the advocates' rights to free expression were unconstitutionally curtailed. See, e.g., Port Authority v. Broome
County Urban League, No. 00958/88 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1988); Port Authority v.
S.S.T. Concord, 90 Misc. 2d 295, 394 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1977).
62 See Ledewitz, supra note 8, for an in-depth discussion on the issue of First
Amendment protection for civil disobedience. The author argues that the First
Amendment should provide limited protection for civil disobedience: "the protest
would be non-violent and the protesters would be subject to normal criminal sanctions. But within those limits, protestors would be free to engage in civil disobedience." Id. at 69; see also Harrop A. Freeman, The Right of Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L.J. 228, 242-46 (1966) (suggesting that the extent to which
civil disobedience should be protected by the First Amendment depends on whether the law the disobedients violated injures a third person).
The overlap of the abortion issue and the First Amendment has spawned
numerous articles and legal analyses. See, e.g., Luke T. Cadigan, Note, Balancing
the Interests: A Practical Approach to Restrictions on Expressive Conduct in the
Anti-Abortion Protest Context, 32 B.C. L. REV. 835 (1991); Bonnie E. Sweeney,
Note, Bering v. Share: Accommodating Abortion and the First Amendment, 38
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 698 (1988).
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have utilized with varying degrees of success and support
throughout American history. The question this Note seeks to
answer is not which of these two acts of civil disobedience was
worthy of First Amendment protection or worthy of greater
support. The only question is: in the balance between
defendants' right to express their political views and the rights
of other citizens to enjoy their liberties, whose right dominates? A court must balance these two competing rights to
determine whether an injunction should issue.
B. Plaintiffs' Interest
After determining that the defendants have an interest in
going ahead with the contested behavior and accepting the
consequences thereof, courts should not issue an injunction
without a clear showing of its necessity. The Supreme Court in
6 3 stated that "a basic doctrine of equity juYounger v. Harris
risprudence [is] that courts of equity should not act ...when
the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."' An injunction should not be granted in the absence of a showing
that the "danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate."" To justify the issuance of an injunction, a plaintiff
must show both that the contested activity will cause harm for
which there is no adequate legal remedy, and that such harm
will occur imminently and with great probability.

€401 U.S. 37 (1971).
C4 Id. at 43-44.

at 45; see also 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2942, at 369
'5 Id.
(quoting Justice Baldwin in Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821,
827 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No. 1617):
There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires
greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in
a doubtful case, than the issuing [of] an injunction; it is the strong arm
of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury,
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy
in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened,
so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction. . . . It will be refused till the court are satisfied that the case before them is of a right about to be destroyed, irreparably injured. ...
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1. Inadequate Remedy at Law
The first limiting principle in deciding whether to enjoin is
the requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law."
Courts have defined a legal remedy as adequate if it is "as
complete, practical and efficient as that which equity could afford."67 Three principles guide a court's discretion in determining when and whether a legal remedy is adequate: (1)
whether there is a threat of irreparable injury; (2) whether
there is a threat of repeated violation that would require the
plaintiff to engage in a multiplicity of actions in order to get
relief; and (3) whether the nature of the interest and extent of
the injury is such that damages would be insufficient compensation. The existence of any of these three factors justifies the
issuance of an injunction based on a showing of inadequate
legal remedy.
The first factor that a court should consider in deciding
whether there is an adequate legal remedy is whether the
plaintiff has made a showing of irreparable harm.6 8 This
showing is not a simple one, as it is not entirely clear what
"irreparable harm" means.6 9 Courts have found irreparable

" Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 154 F.2d 450, 453
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 761 (1946) ("[Tlhe legal remedy must not only be
plain, speedy and adequate, but as adequate to meet the ends of justice as that
which the restraining power of equity is competent to grant.").
" Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923); see also Douglas Laycock,
Injunctions and the IrreparableInjury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1065 (1979). Professor
Laycock states there is a well-settled rule that "[eiquity will not act if there is an
adequate remedy at law ... [where an] [aldequate remedy means a remedy as
complete, practical, and efficient as the equitable remedy." Id. at 1071. In other
words, "[p]laintiff is entitled in all cases to the most complete, practical, and efficient remedy. . . . If a legal and an equitable remedy are equally complete, practical, and efficient, the legal remedy shall be used." Id.
68 "[T]he requirements that government . . . show the irreparable nature of the
harm that would occur if a [pre-action] restraint were not imposed . . . sharply
delimit the areas in which [pre-action] restraints can ever be justified." TRIBE,
supra note 40, at 1051.
Courts require an independent showing of irreparable harm before issuing a
preliminary injunction. For issuance of a permanent injunction, however, such a
showing is only one means of proving that there is no adequate legal remedy. See
Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1124 (5th Cir. 1976). Because this Note addresses issues raised by the issuance of permanent injunctions, the irreparable
injury showing will be considered as only one possible means of showing that
there is no adequate legal remedy.
" Black's Law Dictionary defines "irreparable injury" as not
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harm to exist based on a range of asserted injuries. In
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, ° the Second Circuit, noting that
"[riecitation of [irreparable injury] generally produces more
dust than light," held that to show he will suffer irreparable
injury, a plaintiff "is not required to show that otherwise rigor
mortis will set in forthwith; all that 'irreparable injury'
means... is that unless an injunction is granted, the plaintiff
will suffer harm which cannot be repaired." 1 Under that
standard, for example, the Supreme Court has found that
substantial business losses and possible bankruptcy justified
issuance of an injunction. 2 At the other extreme, in MacBeth
v. Utah, a district court found that the great inconvenience
that suspension of plaintiffs driving privilege would cause him
was not a sufficient showing of irreparable harm. 3 By the
same token, the Sixth Circuit held that "a probable loss of
overtime" was not an adequate showing of irreparable harm. '4
Rather than a concrete definition, courts have found irreparable injury to exist on a spectrum with "rigor mortis" at one
extreme and "inconvenience" at the other; the inquiry remains
extremely fact-sensitive.
After examining the possible irreparable harm, courts may
judge a legal remedy to be inadequate when it does not suffisuch an injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible
compensation in damages, or necessarily great damage, but includes an
injury, whether great or small, which ought not to be submitted to, on
the one hand, or inflicted, on the other; and which, because it is so large
or so small, or is of such constant and frequent occurrence, or because no
certain pecuniary standard exists for the measurement of damages, cannot receive reasonable redress in a court of law. Wrongs of a repeated
and continuing character, or which occasion damages that are estimated
only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard, are included. The
remedy for such is commonly in the nature of injunctive relief. 'Irreparable injury' justifying an injunction is that which cannot be adequately
compensated in damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in
money.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (6th ed. 1990).
'0 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
7'

Id. at 698.

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (Court upheld the issuance of
an injunction preventing the enforcement of a town ordinance proscribing topless
dancing).
71 MacBeth v. Utah, 332 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Utah 1971).
1
Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union, 471 F.2d
872, 877 (6th Cir. 1972) (court declined to enjoin a newspaper from using electronic editing equipment), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
72
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ciently deter the threat of repeated violation.'5 If it is likely
that an award of damages to plaintiff will not deter the same
defendants from violating her rights again," and will merely
force plaintiff to engage in another suit involving the same
issues, the remedy at law is inadequate." Accordingly, an injunction should issue.
Thus, the early New York case of Exchange Bakery &
Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin" held that an injunction may be
granted to "prevent repeated violations, threatened or probable, of the complainant's property rights. 7 9 In that case,
plaintiff sought an injunction against union members who
instigated a strike by several of plaintiffs employees. After the
initial disruption of work in plaintiffs restaurant, defendants
had no further contact with plaintiff. The court refused to
grant an injunction against the strikers, choosing to leave "to
the law redress for single or isolated wrongs."" The court
went on to explain that had there been a danger that defendants would repeat their disruptive actions, issuance of an
injunction may have been appropriate: "The theoretical basis of
this power has been said to be the avoidance of a multiplicity
of actions.... [and] the probability of such interference in the
future."8 '

" Laycock, supra note 67, at 1074 (An "injunction is appropriate only when
plaintiff will suffer additional harm in the future-when the total accrued loss as
of Tuesday will be greater than it is on Monday-and when it is possible to prevent that additional harm from happening."); see also Rendleman, supra note 29,
at 349 (Courts should issue an injunction in a case where, '[i]f the court simply
awards monetary damages, the defendant will probably continue his actions.").
76 The threat of repeated violation falls on a spectrum from possibility to probability of recurrence. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas
Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 681 (D. Neb. 1972) (Nothing suggested the "likelihood of
recurrences of past behavior," making injunctive relief unnecessary.); Johnson v.
Mansfied Hardwood Lumber Co., 143 F. Supp. 826, 834-35 (W.D. La. 1956) (showing that multiple suits "could or would be required" was enough to show that
plaintiffs did not have an adequate legal remedy.).
" See Independent Tape Merchant's Ass'n v. Creamer, 346 F. Supp. 456, 459
(M.D. Pa. 1972) ("[Tlhe exercise of equitable discretion to avoid a multiplicity of
litigation is restricted to cases in which there would otherwise be a necessity for
numerous suits between the same parties involving the same issues; it does not
ordinarily extend to cases involving numerous parties in which the issues between
them . . . are not necessarily identical.").
78 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
79 Id. at 265, 157 N.E. at 133.
so Id.
81 Id.
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The injunction, therefore, acts as a deterrent against future harm. The rationale behind this idea of the injunction as
a deterrent is that "[miost defendants obey injunctions" because of the risk of criminal contempt.8 2 When a court issues

an injunction, it does so with the hope that this risk "may
persuade the defendant to become a better citizen" and refrain
from engaging in the prohibited behavior.8 3
The third factor courts consider in determining whether a
remedy at law is inadequate is the nature of the injury expected. The courts' analysis of this factor involves a consideration
of the plaintiff's threatened interest and whether it is of such
importance that damages would not compensate for its loss.
"[C]ourts have identified a class of interests which are too
important to sanction continued injury by merely imposing
money damages."' This class includes "cases involving school
segregation, prison and hospital mistreatment, and ecological
injury."1) These interests, the courts have determined, are "so
basic that ...

people deserve to enjoy them in fact."" Courts

thus will grant relief where movants seek an injunction to
protect those interests. Moreover, where a court determines
that the injury sought to be prevented by an injunction is so
large or complex that it is unmanageable through civil litigation alone, it will issue an injunction. 7 And finally, where a
computation of damages would be speculative or inadequate to
compensate plaintiff, a court will issue an injunction. 8
82

Rendleman, supra note 29, at 358.

SId.

at 352; see also FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 28, at 59 ("When objective damages fail to compensate for the legally recognized impairment, judges
enjoin to recognize that uncompensated, but legally recognized impairment.").
84 Id.

85 D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 109 (4th ed. 1979); see STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 925, 926 (1843):
[Where [for example]
means of subsistence,
from the wrongful act
fere by injunction ....

loss of health, loss of trade, destruction of the
or permanent ruin to property, may or will ensue
. . . in every such case Courts of Equity will interThe injury is material, and operates daily to de-

stroy or diminish the [exercise of rights of the plaintiff].).

87 Rendleman, supra note 29, at 352.
87 See Laycock, supra note 67, at 1069 ([N]o one has ever suggested that mon-

ey alone would be an adequate remedy for segregated and inferior education.").
8 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, (1952). In this
case, commonly called the "Steel Seizure" case, the Supreme Court held that an
injunction against government seizure of steel mills may be appropriate because
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In the civil rights context, for example, courts frequently
issued injunctive orders requiring desegregation.8 9 In those
cases, the rationale of courts in issuing the injunctions reflected their consideration of ther three factors mentioned above.
First, the busing cases clearly involved interests too important
to be lost, even if courts could award substantial money damages. Money alone would hardly be an adequate remedy for
"segregated and inferior education, for loss of voting rights, or
for the rest of the complex web of discrimination that has created a continuing black underclass in the United States. Money alone cannot undo a harm so complex and pervasive."'
Second, more than suits for damages, injunctions provided the
necessary legal instrument to deal with the enormity of the
problem of school segregation. Only an injunction could reach
beyond those named in the underlying school desegregation
suits to prevent everyone, not just the named defendants, from
obstructing black children's attendance of formerly all white
schools. Finally, the school desegregation cases presented enormous problems of computation of legal remedies. "Proof of
causation and quantification of damages would be monstrously
difficult; immunity defenses would pose problems; the risk of
jury nullification would be high."91 Any computation of damages would be speculative at best and, even then, probably
inadequate to compensate the plaintiffs. Courts thus determined that a remedy at law would have been inadequate due
to the importance of the interests at stake, the enormity of the
.seizure and governmental operation of [steel companies] were bound to result in
many present and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement." Id. at 585; see also Rendleman, supra note 29, at 346
("[p]laintiffs injury is irreparable by money when it cannot be measured, compensated, restored, or repaired").
" See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), where the Supreme
Court granted an injunction against the County School Board of Prince Edward
County and others to prevent them from refusing to operate an efficient public
school system in the County and to prevent payment of public funds to help support private schools that excluded students based on their race. See also Goss v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 214 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1963).
It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the issues raised by injunctions
and desegregation. For a detailed analysis of this area of injunctive law, see FISS,
supra note 27; and Laycock, supra note 67.
90 Laycock, supra note 67, at 1069-70.
91 Id.
at 1068.
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injury and the impossibility of computing accurate damages.
Accordingly, they granted injunctions.
In general, then, a remedy at law is inadequate if it is not
as effective-speedy, efficient or practical-as an equitable
remedy. More specifically, damages are inadequate if the
threatened injury is irreparable; if such damages fail to deter
the defendants from repeating offensive conduct, requiring
plaintiff to sue repeatedly; or, if the plaintiffs interest is so
important and the threatened injury so complex that damages
would be an inappropriate compensation. When a court determines that any of these three factors is present, it should conclude that a legal remedy is insufficient and that equity should
control.
2. Imminence and Probability that Injury will Occur
Having determined that a legal remedy would be inadequate, courts have to ask the next question: how likely is it
that the threatened injury will occur?92 The Second Circuit
has addressed this question squarely and provided some significant guidelines. In New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

See FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 28, at 59 (party seeking an injunction
must show "that there is an imminent threat of harm and that the threatened
harm is 'irreparable'").
There is a range of findings regarding the imminence and probability of irreparable harm. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931) ("Injunction issues to prevent existing or presently threatened injuries. One will not be
granted against something merely feared as liable to occur."); Rogers v. Scurr, 676
F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[Clourts should not get involved unless either a
constitutional violation has already occurred or the threat of such a violation is
both real and immediate."); Carter v. Fort Worth, 456 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972) (Irreparable injury was "purely speculative" and
therefore no injunction issued.); MacBeth v. Utah, 332 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 (D.
Utah 1971) ("Plaintiffs evidence fails to show that the injury caused by the State's
action in this case is certain to cause irreparable damage, a fact necessary before
an injunction can issue .... An injunction, being an extraordinary writ, rean adequate showing of clear and imminent danger of irreparable
quires ...
harm."); First Nat'l Bank in Billings v. First Bank Stock Corp., 197 F. Supp. 417,
428 (1961) ("There must be at least a reasonable probability that the injury will
be done if no injunction is granted and there must be more than mere fear or
apprehension."); Association of Professional Eng. Personnel v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
183 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.N.J. 1960) ('[T]o warrant the granting of an injunction
on ground that irreparable injury is threatened, the injury contemplated must be
real, not fancied; actual not prospective; and threatened, not imagined."), rev'd on
other grounds, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961).

"
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sion,93 the court refused to grant an injunction where the
movant had failed "to meet its heavy burden of clearly establishing the threat of irreparable harm."' In that case, the
movant sought to enjoin the transport by air of plutonium and
other nuclear material, alleging that the risk of crashes or
terrorist attacks could result in environmental disasters. 5
The court analyzed these allegations by examining various factors that, when considered sequentially, illustrate the patent
improbability of the risk:
Let us assume for purposes of argument that the following extreme-

ly remote possibilities occur simultaneously: 1) an aircraft crashes;
2) the aircraft is one of the minuscule number carrying plutonium;
3) the aircraft is damaged so severely that the cargo is subjected to
stresses; and 4) the container protecting the plutonium is unable to
withstand the applied forces and it cracks.... [WMe think it is already eminently obvious that the threat of harm from an accidental
air crash is indeed extremely remote.'

The court concluded that such risks were too remote to warrant the granting of an injunction.
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit explained
that the "drastic remedy" of an injunction is inappropriate
where the action sought to be enjoined "is by no means certain
to produce" the irreparable harm the movants fear.97 Rather,
the threat of irreparable harm must be "more than possible; it
[must be] certain and imminent."" A court should use its equitable power only with a showing that the threats of irreparable harm "are not remote or speculative but are actual and
imminent.... The dramatic and drastic power of injunctive
force may be unleashed only against conditions generating a
presently existing actual threat; it may not be used
simply to
99
eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury."

The NRC court achieved its result by distinguishing the
movants' case from earlier cases involving environmental
despoliation where circuit courts had granted injunctions."'
93
94

550 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 753.

11 Id. at 746-47.
96 Id.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755 (citations omitted).
9 Id. (second sentence quoting Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409
F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969)).
"o Id. at 753-55; see Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
17

98
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In Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
for example, the Sixth Circuit relied on specific findings by the
district court that the "activities relating to irreparable defacement of the environment were continuing."' 0 ' Such a showing
convinced the court that future defacement would occur with
the requisite probability to issue an injunction. In Scherr v.
Volpe, moreover, the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction on
findings by the district court that the "immediate effects" of
the contested activity would cause irreparable environmental
damage.0 2 Such findings led the court to conclude that the
threat of irreparable harm was imminent and probable. In
these two cases, the NRC court explained, the plaintiffs had
made specific showings that the defendants' actions would
have caused "immediate, demonstrable and irreparable damage"01 3 and, therefore, injunctive relief had been appropriate.
In the case before the Second Circuit, however, the plaintiffs
had made no such specific showing of imminent harm. As a
result, the court concluded that, because the defendants' actions were "by no means certain to produce the cataclysmic
consequences appellant fears will ensue,"' 4 injunctive relief
was inappropriate.' 5
Although courts have never provided concrete definitions
of "inadequate legal remedy" and "imminent, probable threat,"
they appear willing to recognize a range of situations that

468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) (affirming injunction of defendant's dam and reservoir project based on showing by plaintiffs that they would suffer irreparable harm
from continuation of defendant's construction activities which were permanently
defacing the natural environment); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972)
(injunction granted to prevent further construction or development of a highway
project that would alter natural wildlife habitats, strip forest land causing erosion,
and cause other alterations in the environment).
' Environmental Defense Fund, 468 F.2d at 1183.
1.2 Scherr, 466 F.2d at 1029.

New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745, 754 (2d Cir. 1977).
"C1
Id.
"c In Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1979), the court denied a distributor's motion for an injunction against a manufacturer to prevent him from supplying certain products to certain customers. In so
doing, the court explained that "[als to the kind of irreparable harm that the
party seeking an injunction must show, the language of some past cases has suggested to some a spectrum ranging from possible to probable." Id. at 72 (footnote
omitted). The opinion went on to note, however, that in New York v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, "the panel uses the probability formulation, expressly
reject[ing] mere possible injury as a sufficient basis for an injunction. Id.
I4
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meet these standards. The one firm requirement is that both
elements be present. In the NRC case, the plaintiffs had clearly shown a risk of irreparable harm for which there would be
no adequate legal remedy. That showing alone, however, did
not convince the Second Circuit to issue an injunction. Without
the second showing that the irreparable harm was probable
and imminent, no injunction would issue. In Environmental
Defense Fund and Scherr, on the other hand, the plaintiffs
made both showings, and the courts issued the injunctions.
Thus, courts must find that both factors are present before
determining that the balance has tipped in favor of the
movant's attempt to prevent the contested behavior. Otherwise, the balance should tip against the movant and the court
should allow the behavior to go forward.

III. APPLYING THE STANDARDS
A. Defendants' Interests: Civil Disobedience
As examined in Part I, the importance of civil disobedience
stems from its symbolic expression of protest. The Holland
Tunnel action was just that: people sitting down in front of the
Tunnel to protest a restrictive Supreme Court decision on
abortion. They did not target the drivers whose cars were
slowed down in the traffic; nor did they target the Port Authority itself. They chose the Holland Tunnel because it was highly
visible and likely to attract the kind of attention to the prochoice cause the protesters were seeking.
On the other hand, Operation Rescue's blockades were not
purely symbolic expressions of protest against laws allowing
abortion, but rather well-coordinated attempts to interfere with
those laws. Randall Terry, the Operation Rescue leader who
directs the demonstrations and blockades, has said, "Operation
Rescue is not about protest or civil disobedience. It is about
saving the lives of babies scheduled to be murdered.""°6 As
1"0

Enemy of Abortions Is Also Taking Issue With Protest Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 31, 1988, at A14; see also Lynn Paltrow, Operation Rescue: Civil Disobedience or Religious Fanaticism? (unpublished manuscript on file with the Brooklyn
Law Review) ("Operation Rescue blockades are not acts of nonviolent civil disobedience any more than were "the jeering white supremacists who blockaded the
school doorways to African American children in Little Rock in the 1950's.").

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCEAND INJUNCTIONS

1994]

such, some have argued that this kind of interference-without
the concomitant political protest-is not expressive conduct
rising to the level of importance that has led Americans to
accept civil disobedience as holding a "legitimate if informal
place in the political culture of their community."" 7 Rather,
it is destructive behavior that leads to violence and greater disruption, closer to a revolutionary conspiracy than a national
campaign of political protest.'
This distinction is particularly well exemplified by the
murder of Dr. David Gunn. In March 1993, an anti-abortion
protester shot and killed Dr. Gunn, a doctor who performed
abortions in three Southern states, during an anti-abortion
demonstration and blockade outside the doctor's clinic.0 9 In
the days and weeks before the murder, Operation Rescue had
distributed a "Wanted" poster at rallies and blockades that
featured a picture of Dr. Gunn, his regular itinerary and his
phone numbers. It read, 'We need your help to stop Dr. David
Gunn.""' Dr. Gunn's murder was the first and to-date the
only of its kind, but there has been a rise in violence against
clinics in general, and doctors and clinic staff in particular. A
national pro-choice organization that represents clinics said
that reports of vandalism have more than doubled from 1991
to 1992, and that cases of arson against clinics tripled from
four in 1990 to twelve in 1992."' Furthermore, health care
workers have been hospitalized after chemicals were sprayed
into their clinic,"' and twenty-seven incidents of violence
against providers were reported in the first two months of
1993."3

While anti-abortion groups like Operation Rescue were
quick to disclaim any connection with Dr. Gunn's admitted

107

Larry Rohter, Doctor is Slain During Protest Over Abortions, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 11, 1993, at Al.
...
The Supreme Court recently held in National Org. for Women v. Scheidler,
114 S. Ct. 798 (1994), that RICO may be applied to Operation Rescue and other
anti-abortion groups, as part of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion
clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity. See infra note 208.
'" Rohter, supra note 107, at Al.
110 Felicity Barringer, Abortion Clinics Preparingfor More Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1993, at Al, A17 (picture accompanying article).
...Rohter, supra note 107, at Al, B10.
112

Id.

...Id. at Al, B10 (chart accompanying article).
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killer, Michael Griffin, they were not so quick to denounce
wholeheartedly the slaying. The national director of Rescue
America, the group that organized the protest outside Dr.
Gunn's clinic, said, "While Gunn's death is unfortunate, it's
also true that quite a number of babies' lives will be
saved."' The regional director of the group, Reverend John
Burt, told the press immediately after the murder, "[nlo babies
will die for the next three or four weeks. It's something good
coming out of something bad."" 5 Randall Terry concurred:
"While we grieve for [Dr. Gunn] and for his widow and for his
children, we must also grieve for the thousands of children
that he has murdered."" 6 He further reminded a reporter
that "David Gunn was a mass murderer.... What Michael
[Griffin] did was absolutely not justifiable. However, what
David Gunn has been doing for years is also absolutely not
justifiable."" 7 Many anti-abortion groups say that harassment of doctors who perform abortion has become one of their
most effective tactics. Randall Terry crowed, "We've found the
weak link is the doctor. We're going to expose them. We're
going to humiliate them.""'
These attitudes seem to create an atmosphere of tolerance
for, if not outright encouragement of, the violence. Bill Price,
who is the head of Texans United for Life, admitted that "there
has been a philosophical or even moral groundwork laid for
assassinating abortionists by certain people in the pro-life
movement, and I think they bear some of the blame.""'
While the blocking of clinics itself may be civil disobedience
that rises to the level of symbolic expression worthy of heightened protection, it leads to violence and disruption that is
inherently inapposite to the First Amendment. This is not the
kind of civil disobedience that Americans have come to accept
as holding a legitimate place in their spectrum of political expression.

Id. at Al, B1.
Houppert, John Burt's Holy War: One Minister's Dangerous Battle to
Save the Unborn, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 6, 1993, at 27, 28.
116 Barringer, supra note 110, at Al, A17.
""All Things Considered: Randall Terry Labels Slain Doctor "Mass Murderer"
(National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 11, 1993).
. Rohter, supra note 107, at Al, B10.
"' Barringer, supra note 110, at Al, A17.
114

115 Keran
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B. Plaintiffs'Interests
1. Port Authority v. WHAM120
Two hundred activists sitting down in front of the Holland
Tunnel created a traffic jam, frustrated pedestrians and forced
the city to pay its police force overtime to clear the street. This
action was annoying and probably not beneficial to the
activists' cause. 2 ' That was not enough, however, to meet the
standards for the issuance of an injunction. First, in this case
there was a perfectly adequate remedy at law: the harm alleged was not irreparable; there was no threat of repeated
violation; and the nature of the threatened interest and extent
of the threatened injury were not such that damages would be
inadequate compensation. Moreover, although the movant in
Port Authority v. WHAM showed that some injury was imminent, that injury did not rise to such a level that a legal remedy would be inadequate. Furthermore, movant's allegations
that did rise to such a level did not reach the requisite level of
imminence and probability. Movant failed, therefore, to make
both showings required for the issuance of an injunction and,
accordingly, the court erred in issuing one.
a. Inadequate Remedy at Law
In moving to enjoin the Holland Tunnel action, plaintiff
first sought to show that the planned civil disobedience would
cause irreparable injury. In its complaint, the plaintiff, Port
Authority, alleged three kinds of "irreparable injury:" traffic

20 No. 42950/92 (1st Dep't July 1, 1992) (order granting preliminary injunction).
121 In the aftermath of the Holland Tunnel action, there was some press and

public reaction to the protest suggesting that although people sympathized with
the cause, they did not necessarily approve of the tactics. See, e.g., Catherine S.
Manegold, Abortion-Rights Backers Protest at Holland Tunnel, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,

1992, at B3:
Most of the several hundred onlookers said they essentially supported the

protesters' cause. But some were less than charitable about the tactics. "I
live in Woodbridge, N.J., and I want to go home," said a construction
worker. "This place is no good for this sort of thing. I've been wanting to
get home since 3 o'clock." When asked about the abortion rights issue, he

waved his hand dismissively.
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jams, environmental pollution and interference with emergency
vehicles. Affidavits attached to the Port Authority's complaint
alleged that the planned action to blockade the Holland Tunnel
would "impede the normal and reasonable flow of traffic, block
vehicular traffic,"122 and "cause severe and extreme congestion in the roadways of the Holland Tunnel and undoubtedly
the surrounding New York City Streets.""' Moreover,
vehicular traffic at the Holland Tunnel on [July 2] will be heavy
with people beginning a long holiday weekend and others using the
tunnel to attend, among other things, the fireworks display in Manhattan on the East River.... Generally, any delays in traffic flow
increase tension on the part of drivers, and if the planned act to
close the Holland Tunnel were permitted, an increase in confrontations between drivers, vehicles, and protestors could very well ensue, causing injuries.""

In addition, the New York Post ran a brief article warning
motorists about possible congestion over July 4th weekend.'2 5
The article, entitled Drivers Beware: Nightmare on Canal St.,
warned, "[miotorists trying to make an early getaway on the
Fourth of July weekend can expect a traffic nightmare because
protestors plan to blockade the Holland Tunnel
while the
12
Brooklyn Bridge is shut for a fireworks display."
There is no question that the proposed civil disobedience
would cause inconvenience and annoyance. The blockade would
no doubt cause problems for the police, city residents and travellers, creating a generally unpleasant beginning for the long
July 4th weekend. However, a showing of inconvenience-even
great inconvenience--did not justify the use of the powerful
tool of equity. The legal remedy in this case was adequate:
police would arrest those blockading the Tunnel and clear the
streets as quickly as possible. Traffic would then resume its
normal flow (if there is such a thing as a normal traffic flow in
New York City) and people would get themselves out of New
York as planned, even if a little later than expected. That is
not irreparable harm. If traffic jams and commuters desperate

1 Affidavit of Edward M. Conover at %%10-11, Port Authority (No. 42950/92).
123 Affidavit of Benjamin Smith at %3, Port Authority (No. 42950/92).
12 Affidavit of Edward M. Conover at %%
10-11, Port Authority (No. 42950/92).
12' Don Broderick, Drivers Beware: Nightmare on Canal St., N.Y. POST, June 19,
1992, at 8.
126 Id.

19941

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCEAND INJUNCTIONS

1527

to get out of New York were a sufficient showing of "irreparable harm," courts would issue injunctions every rush hour and
holiday weekend. On the weekend in question, for example, the
organizers of the fireworks display who arranged to have the
Brooklyn Bridge shut down should have been enjoined from
putting on the show. This first allegation thus did not meet the
heavy burden of showing irreparable harm.
The Port Authority's second and third allegations arguably
did meet the requirement that the contested activity threatened to cause irreparable harm. Movants alleged that "resultant gridlock on the streets outside the Tunnel would increase
the amount of auto emissions, including carbon monoxide,
spewed into the air, increasing the risk of illness to individuals
with respiratory problems in the area."'2 7 They further alleged that "there is a serious risk that the planned obstruction
of traffic at the Holland Tunnel or other Port Authority facilities will endanger public safety by slowing the progress of
emergency vehicles, including ambulances, fire fighting equipment and police vehicles." 2 ' A person who contracted lung
cancer or whose asthma is exacerbated as a result of increased
pollution generated by excess traffic, created, in turn, by the
blockade of the Holland Tunnel, has been irreparably harmed.
Similarly, a person delayed in arriving at a hospital because
the ambulance she was riding in was stalled in traffic caused
by the Holland Tunnel blockade may well have been irreparably injured. Thus, on their face, these allegations met the required showing of irreparable harm.
In addition to showing the irreparable harm the contested
behavior might cause, movant could have alleged that the
danger of recurring injury would render inadequate an award

5, Port Authority (No. 42950/92); see also
" Affidavit of Benjamin Smith, at
Affidavit of Edward M. Conover at 91917-8, 12, Port Authority (No. 42950/92):
Interference with traffic flows into and out of the tunnel . . . place the
Public at serious risk. Emergency Response teams would have serious
problems attempting to get to individuals in need of assistance anywhere
in the vicinity of the tunnel because of gridlock. Further, vehicles and
individuals inside the tunnel itself and in need of assistance would also
[G]ridlock on the streets surrounding the enbe severely affected ....
trances and exits at the Holland Tunnel would increase the amount of
auto emissions including carbon monoxide, spewed into the air, increasing
the risk of illness to those with respiratory problems in the area.
12 Plaintiffs Complaint at J1 6, Port Authority (No. 42950/92).
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of damages. Courts frequently use the injunction as a means of
deterring future anti-social behavior by defendants. Thus, a
showing that such behavior was likely to recur absent the
equitable order would have justified its issuance. Plaintiff Port
Authority failed to allege such a danger, however, because no
such threat could be inferred from the planned civil disobedience. It was clear from the flyers and phone messages advertising the Holland Tunnel action that it was a one-time
event. 2 9 Whatever harm Port Authority would suffer from
the planned civil disobedience would be confined to the one
action; there was no threat that "the total accrued loss as of
Tuesday [would] be greater than it [was] on Monday." 3 ' The
group that planned the blockade was an "ad-hoc coalition,"
organized specifically for this one demonstration. Therefore,
the risk that the defendant civil disobedients would ignore the
law repeatedly and force plaintiffs to fight multiple legal battles in order to be compensated was minimal. The police would
drag the protesters away and the city would resume its normality-there would be no on-going or recurring injury. Thus,
the use of an injunction as a deterrent for future, recurring
harm was unnecessary.
Finally, movant sought to show that the interests at stake
were so important and the extent of the injury threatened so
great that a legal remedy would be inadequate. Clearly, the
Port Authority's first allegation did not rise to the level of
significance envisioned by the court when granting injunctions
based on the importance of the interest. The interest in keeping Port Authority's facilities free of traffic jams cannot be
analogous to the interest in protecting against "school segregation, prison and hospital mistreatment, and ecological injury."'13' Those are interests whose loss is irreparable-a child
denied an education; a prisoner beaten and badly fed; a family
exposed to contaminated air and water. Society does not have
the same interest in preventing a bottle-neck in Lower Manhattan as in providing decent schooling, habitable prisons and
clean air and water. The nature of the interest in Port

" See, e.g., Affidavit of Peter Thomas Caram at 1
Authority (No. 42950/92).
...Rendleman, supra note 29, at 349.
LOUISELL & HAZARD, supra note 85, at 109.

6, 7, 8, Exhibit A, Port
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Authority's first allegation thus did not rise to the requisite
level of significance to justify an injunction.
Moreover, the arrest of two hundred protestors in a matter
of one or two hours is not analogous to untangling complex
systems of segregation, environmental pollution or administrative bureaucracy. There was no danger that people other than
those arrested at the Holland Tunnel would seek to tie up
traffic, contrasted with the danger that people other than those
named in desegregation law suits would seek to block desegregation efforts. Thus the scope of the injury the Port Authority
described in its first allegation would not have been unmanageable through civil litigation alone. Finally, damages would
be impossible to compute because the injury itself was mere
inconvenience. If motorists or the Port Authority could be compensated for time spent tied up in traffic, the quality of New
York City life would be different indeed. This was not what the
courts envisioned when reasoning that an injunction was appropriate due to the speculative or inadequate nature of a
damage award. The first allegation, therefore, did not show
that the nature of the interest or extent of injury was such
that no legal remedy would be adequate.
The second and third allegations-the risk of environmental pollution and stalling of emergency vehicles-arguably did
approach the level of significance and extent of loss envisioned
by the courts in these cases. The interests in keeping the environment clean and in facilitating transport to hospitals are
analogous to the interest in desegregated schooling and ecological safety. These are interests the Port Authority had the right
to insist on allowing people to enjoy in fact, interests too important "to sanction continued injury by merely imposing money damages."13 2 And, while the scope of the problem-the
one-time blockade of the Holland Tunnel-was not as daunting
as an entire segregated school system, damages to compensate
for loss of health or life due to the increased pollution or the
stalling of emergency vehicles would be difficult to compute.
Any damage award would necessarily be speculative and would
risk being inadequate. An argument could be made, therefore,
that the nature of the interests and extent of the injuries contained in allegations two and three rose to the level necessary
I" Rendleman, supra note 29, at 352.
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to show that a legal remedy would be inadequate.
b. Imminence and Probabilityof Injury
It is well settled that a showing of the mere possibility
that the threatened harm might occur is not enough to enjoin
the contested behavior. 13 3 Here, there was no showing of a
"real danger that the act complained of will actually take
place, " 13' but rather an allegation of remote and possible
harm. In this sense, Port Authority v. WHAM 131 is analogous
to New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'36 in which
the court refused to grant an injunction based on the remoteness of the threatened harm." ' Accordingly, an injunction
should not have issued against the Holland Tunnel action.
Only two of plaintiffs allegations rose to the requisite level
of irreparable injury, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate any
real danger that these alleged injuries would come to pass.
First, plaintiffs alleged that the increased pollution caused by
the traffic jam would raise the chances that bystanders, pedestrians and area residents would develop respiratory and lung
problems. This allegation involves a very complex chain of
causation from the planned civil disobedience to the development of lung problems. As such, it hardly rose to the level of
imminence and probability envisioned by the Second Circuit in
NRC.
Port Authority's second allegation, that the proposed civil
disobedience risked slowing down emergency vehicles, also fell
short of the Second Circuit's probability standard. As planned,
the action was to block only the New Jersey-bound side of the
Tunnel, leaving the east-bound side open for cars in the Tunnel to use as an exit. Moreover, ambulances and emergency
vehicles rarely use the tunnel; it is an interstate highway and
generally ambulances do not travel out of state."8 In order

'3 See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
's' New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1262
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989).
13 No. 42950/92 (1st Dep't July 2, 1992) (ordering a preliminary injunction).
135 550 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 755-56.
According to the Health and Hospitals Corporation, which is in charge of all
New York City ambulances, public ambulances do not use the Holland Tunnel. In
"
'
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for the alleged irreparable harm to have occurred, the following would have had to transpire: (1) the blockade went forward
and actually succeeded in blocking one lane of the Holland
Tunnel; (2) an emergency vehicle was in the Tunnel when the
blockade occurred; (3) the emergency vehicle was unable to
turn around in the free lane and get out of the New Jersey
side of the Tunnel; and (4) the extra number of police-who
generally outnumber protestors by two to one-were unable to
clear the opening of the Tunnel in time for the emergency vehicle to get out. Because of the infrequency of use of the Tunnel
by emergency vehicles, the ample warning, as exhibited by the
New York Post story,'39 of the potential traffic tie-ups making
such use even more unlikely and the efficiency of the police in
clearing away civil disobedients, it was very unlikely that all of
those events would come to pass. This allegation, therefore,
while possible, did not rise to the probability of occurrence
required by federal courts for the issuance of an injunction.
Because of the drastic nature of the injunctive remedy,
courts must consider both the required showings-that a legal
remedy is inadequate and that the threatened harm is imminent and probable-in determining whether an injunction
should issue. Absence of one or the other renders issuance of
the injunction inappropriate. Movant Port Authority's first
allegation arguably rose to the level of imminence and probability of occurrence required for the issuance of an injunction.
It was fairly certain and probable that a traffic jam would
result from the planned civil disobedience. However, that allegation of harm did not rise to the requisite level of significance

response to the question, "Do ambulances use the Holland Tunnel?," Specialist Ida
Locascio, in HHC's Emergency Medical Services Department, replied, "None of ours
do. We operate in the five boroughs. We don't go out of state. New Jersey has its
own ambulances." Telephone Interview with Ida Locascio (Dec. 1, 1992). Moreover,
there is little evidence that many private ambulances use the Holland Tunnel. Any
ambulance or emergency vehicle that uses an interstate highway would do so only
with a police escort. While the Port Authority does not keep statistics on the
kinds of vehicles that use their facilities, the New York Police Department would
have records of all significant activity of N.Y.P.D. cars and personnel while on the
job. Joanne Scutero, the reference librarian at the Municipal Reference Library,
which maintains all N.Y.P.D. statistics, indicated that there were no statistics
whatsoever on use of the Holland Tunnel by emergency vehicles, noting that "obviously it doesn't happen often enough that anyone would bother to keep statistics
on it." Telephone Interview with Joanne Scutero (Dec. 1, 1992).
39 See supra note 125.
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to render a legal remedy inadequate. The other two allegations, which arguably did show the risk of irreparable harm for
which there was no adequate legal remedy, failed to rise to the
level of probability required. Therefore, the court in Port Authority v. WHAM should have followed the Second Circuit14
and, in balancing the equities, found that the scales tipped in
favor of the right to political protest. Accordingly, an injunction
should not have issued.
2. Operation Rescue
Two hundred activists sitting down in front of an urban
health clinic created traffic jams, frustrated pedestrians and
forced the city to pay its police force overtime to clear the
street and sidewalk. In addition, however, the protesters
threatened and intimidated patients and disrupted doctors and
nurses. One of Operation Rescue's lawyers acknowledged that
"' [h]arassment' is an appropriate term even for those, like
myself, who sympathize with the tactics of these protests." 4
On various occasions, movants have successfully shown that
the Operation Rescue blockades have created a risk of harm
for which there was no adequate legal remedy, and that the
threatened injury was imminent and probable, not merely
possible and remote. 4 1 Courts, therefore, have properly issued injunctions against Operation Rescue's clinic blockades.
a. InadequateRemedy at Law
The first standard that the plaintiffs had to meet was that
there would be no adequate remedy at law for the injuries that
the contested behavior threatened to cause. Movants against
Operation Rescue have shown that the injury threatened by
the blockades would be irreparable; that Operation Rescue's
behavior was likely to recur; and that the nature of the interest was of such importance that damages would be an insufficient remedy. Thus, injunctions have been necessary and ap-

140

NRC, 550 F.2d at 745; Jackson Dairy, Inc., v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596

F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
1.1 Ledewitz, supra note 8, at 89.
141 See cases cited supra note 5.
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propriate to prevent the harm.
In the context of the clinic blockades, allegations of irreparable harm have included both physical and emotional injury.
The Ninth Circuit held that injunctions were properly issued
against Operation Rescue's clinic blockades to protect "the
ability of the clinic to provide medical services free from interference that may endanger the health and safety of its patients." More specifically, a district court in Virginia recognized the risk that certain medical procedures that are not
completed in a timely manner may result in "infection, bleeding and other potentially serious complications." 1 Finally, a
Pennsylvania district court found the risk of irreparable harm
to exist based on the emotional suffering patients may experience as a result of the blockades:
Women entering and leaving clinics have been verbally harassed;
the effect of such harassment has been to increase the level of anxiety a woman feels and to exacerbate any emotional problems associated with the abortion decision and procedure which in turn may
have an adverse effect on the medical procedure itself and on the
patient's psychological well-being thereafter.'45

In addition, anecdotal evidence shows that the clinic blockades have lead to harassment and violence which, in turn, has
forced doctors and health care workers to stop performing
abortions. Following the slaying of Dr. Gunn in Pensacola,
Florida, two doctors at the only abortion clinic in Brevard
County quit. " 6 Dr. Curtis Boyd, a doctor who has performed
abortions for twenty-five years all over the Southwest, expressed his concern that the blockades would discourage pro-

Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d
681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988).
I" National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489
(E.D. Va. 1989).
14 American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F.
Supp. 656, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). In this case, action was
brought by physicians, a physicians' professional organization, several clinical providers of first-trimester abortions and members of the clergy and an individual,
challenging the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act. Considering the constitutionality of the same Act, the Supreme Court in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), overruled Thornburgh's requirement that the
state must have a compelling interest in order to regulate abortions in the first
trimester. The language quoted, however, remains good law.
' Sara Rimer, Abortion Foes in Boot Camp Mull Doctor's Killing, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 19, 1993, at A12.
1
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viders from continuing to offer services: "I think many other
health care providers [have concerns] also-not just physicians.
I think both counselors, administrators, nurses, medical technicians have all been subject to this harassment, and objects of
the violence at times." 147
These allegations of irreparable harm fall squarely within
the spectrum of showings that courts have recognized as constituting irreparable injury. The allegations of physical and
emotional injury are not analogous to the inconvenience suffered for the loss of a driver's license'48 or the loss of overtime," for which the courts would not issue an injunction.
Rather, the potential for physical injury and emotional suffering is analogous, at the very least, to the substantial business
losses and possible bankruptcy threatened in Doran v. Salem
Inn,5 ' where the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of an
injunction. In the Operation Rescue cases, even if police could
clear up the demonstration in a matter of hours, the irreparable harm to the women seeking medical care would have already occurred. Thus, the legal remedy would be inadequate to
protect against the alleged harm.' 5 '
In addition to showing irreparable harm, movants could
seek to show that defendants intended to continue inflicting
the threatened injury and, therefore, that a legal remedy
would be inadequate. One of the injunction's primary purposes
is to act as a deterrent against future harm to plaintiffs by
defendants. Movants against Operation Rescue have successfully shown that such a deterrent is necessary to prevent future attacks on clinics. Recently, in New York State National
Organization for Women v. Terry, the court issued an injunc-

14 All Things Considered: Doctor Who Performed Abortions Stoically Continues
Work (National Public Radio, Mar. 11, 1993).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
1
14. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
150 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (finding that the threat of bankruptcy is the type
of injury that sufficiently meets the standards for granting interim relief).
...Courts have found that interference with the decision of whether to have an
abortion constitutes irreparable harm. In Kennan v. Warren, 328 F. Supp. 525
(W.D. Wis. 1971), affd without opinion, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972), the Supreme Court
affirmed a district court's holding that state interference with a doctor's right to
perform an abortion and with a pregnant woman's right to decide whether to have
an abortion risked allowing those rights to be lost irreparably. The court granted
an injunction against such interference to protect those rights.
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tion based in part on the fact that "defendants have repeatedly
forcibly denied access to abortion facilities in the New York
area, and they intend to continue to do so." 52 Moreover, in
affirming the district court, the Second Circuit explained that
"defendants' stated intent to continue the blockades-notwithstanding the specter of serious legal and financial consequences-and to act in spite of the district court's orders show that
the harm will be of a continuing nature absent an injunction."153
Thus, unlike in Exchange Bakery v. Ri/kin, where there
was no threat that defendants would repeatedly cause injury to
the plaintiffs,"s in the Operation Rescue cases, the possibility
that violations would recur and cause repeated injury is great.
Arresting the particular group of people blockading the clinic
on one given day would not prevent them, or others from Operation Rescue, from blockading the clinic the next day. Keeping
in mind the role of an injunction as a deterrent, issuance in
the case of Operation Rescue's clinic blockades was not only
appropriate, but necessary to prevent protestors from continuing to violate the law.
Finally, movants have sought to show that the nature of
the interest or the extent of the injury threatened were such
that money damages would not compensate the injured parties.
In the Operation Rescue cases, movants sought to protect the
patients' access to health care. Such an interest is analogous to
the rights of African-American children to attend desegregated
schools, or the rights of citizens to live free of ecological disaster. Society's interest in safeguarding access to health care is
comparable to its interest in safeguarding access to education
and to a clean and safe environment. These are rights people
should be able to enjoy in fact, not merely compensated later
for their loss.
Moreover, the scope of the Operation Rescue blockades of
clinics is such that civil litigation alone would not be sufficient
to safeguard access to health care. A suit for damages against
a few named leaders of a blockade would not protect the clinics
12 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989).

" New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1362 (2d
Cir. 1989).
11 245 N.Y. 260 (1927) (refusing to grant injunction against striking workers);
see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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from those not named in the suit. The footsoldiers and faithful
would be out in force, even as their leaders were jailed. Only
an injunction would encompass everyone seeking to block the
clinics. Finally, as the Second Circuit in Terry explained,
"those women denied access cannot be compensated by money
damages; injunctive relief alone can assure them the clinics'
availability."155 By showing the importance of their interest
and extent of the threatened injury, movants successfully
achieved the third means of showing that a legal remedy
would be inadequate. On this basis, injunctions have been
properly issued.
b. Imminence and Probabilityof Injury
In addition to showing that there was no adequate remedy
at law for the threatened harm, movants successfully showed
that this harm was not remote and merely possible. Rather,
Op6ration Rescue's clinic blockades presented imminent and
probable threats of irreparable harm. In Terry, the Second
Circuit considered the harm that had resulted from Operation
Rescue's blockades in the past, "including the medical risks
and the denial of constitutionally guaranteed rights."56
Based on those findings, the court concluded that the risk of
irreparable harm from defendants' activities was "real and
threatens to continue."'57 Like the Sixth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund, the Second Circuit found sufficient probability of harm to exist, based on the continuing nature of the
defendants' activities and resulting injury, to warrant the issuance of an injunction.
Moreover, in OperationRescue v. NOW, the Fourth Circuit
followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Scherr by issuing
an injunction based on the "immediate effects" of the
defendants' activities. 5 ' A blockade that closed down the clinic would force patients "requiring the laminaria removal procedure or other vital medical services [to] either postpone the
required treatment and assume the attendant risks or seek the

15'

Terry, 886 F.2d at 1362.

156

Id.

157 Id.

158 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989)

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCEAND INJUNCTIONS

1994]

services elsewhere."159 Like the immediate environmental
despoliation threatened by defendants' activities in Scherr, the
irreparable harm to these patients would occur as soon as
defendants began their blockade. Based on those findings of
imminence, the court issued an injunction.
Rather than creating a possibility of harm-a standard
rejected by the Second Circuit as insufficient for the granting
of an injunction' 6 -- the risk of irreparable harm in the Operation Rescue cases rose to the necessary probability to warrant
such a remedy. That probability, coupled with the showing
that legal remedies would be inadequate, tipped the scales in
favor of protecting women from irreparable harm and against
Operation Rescue's right to political protest. As the Second
Circuit noted in Terry, "[i]nsofar as appellants' rights of free
speech were exercised in close proximity to individual women
entering or leaving the clinics so as to ... assault or harass

them, appellants' rights ended where those women's rights began." 6 ' Accordingly, courts have concluded correctly that injunctive relief was appropriate against Operation Rescue's civil
disobedience.
IV. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS AS A FINAL FACTOR IN THE
INJUNCTION EQUATION

After courts consider the plaintiff's interest in having the
behavior enjoined and the defendant's interest in going forward with the contested behavior, they have considered the
interest of the public either in enjoining the contested activity,
or in allowing it to take place.'62 If the challenged conduct
1

Id. at 1489.

..See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
...Terry, 886 F.2d at 1343. See also Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994). Upholding an injunction, the Florida Supreme Court
held that restrictions on certain activities against a clinic, patients and staff were
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, left
open ample alternative channels of communication and not overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case on April
28, 1994.
1C 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2942, at 376; see also WILLIAM1 Q. DE
FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 18 (2d ed. 1956); Rendleman, supra note
29, at 347 ('If social and procedural policy support the decision to enjoin ...
equity's 'strong arm,' the injunction forbids the wrong instead of compensating for

1538

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1497

seriously impinges on matters of public policy, then the court
may decide to grant relief. If not, however, the court may decide to let the conduct go forward. When weighing the public
and governmental interest, courts necessarily have to consider
the actual rights at stake. In the cases under consideration, on
one side of the scale was the importance of political expression,
and, particularly, the importance of civil disobedience. In the
WHAM case, the rights on the other side of the scale did not
implicate government or public interest with sufficient weight
to tip the balance in favor of an injunction. In the Operation
Rescue cases, on the other hand, the rights asserted by the
movants were of sufficient public and governmental interest to
outweigh Operation Rescue's asserted interest, and courts have
justifiably enjoined their behavior.
A. The Rights at Stake
Injunctions are essentially a remedy for behavior that has
not occurred, but which threatens to cause harm to people or
interests if it did occur. Although "[riemedial doctrine does not
concern itself with defining substantive interests but, instead,
concerns itself with the proper method of vindicating interests
that wrongdoers have injured,"16 3 it is important to understand what substantive rights and interests are at stake. In
both cases under consideration, the threatened substantive
right was characterized by the plaintiffs as the right to travel.
The Holland Tunnel protesters allegedly infringed on the right
to travel of anyone wishing to go through the Tunnel, and of
area residents to move freely. The Operation Rescue protesters
allegedly infringed on the right of patients, their families,
doctors and other workers to enter and exit health clinics freely and to seek and deliver medical care. Moreover, these protestors infringed on women s right to have an abortion.
At first glance, it would seem that the government had an
equal interest in protecting the rights of both groups of plaintiffs against the contested civil disobedience. On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the right to travel is
more than constitutional protection for free movement of traffic

its occurrence.").

13 Rendleman, supra note 29, at 346.
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across state lines; it has become a catch-all protection for many
rights, including, most recently, the right to have access to
health care, free of obstruction. Thus, the interference with the
"right to travel" in the Operation Rescue cases-meaning, really, the interference with people's access to health care-implicated the constitutional protection more significantly than
WHAM's blockade of the Holland Tunnel. In addition, Operation Rescue's blockades interfered with women's right to have
abortions. Therefore, the government had a strong interest in
enjoining this civil disobedience, while such an interest did not
exist in the Holland Tunnel case.
1. The Right to Travel
The right to travel has been part of the bundle of rights
Americans have taken for granted since the beginning of our
history as a country. The Articles of Confederation provided
that "The people of each State shall have free ingress and
regress to and from any other State."" The right appears to
find its constitutional roots in three places: the Commerce
Clause,'65 the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
Four 66 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 7 though it does not appear explicitly anywhere in the Constitution. The Supreme Court has suggested that the omission can be explained by understanding
that
a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a
necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.... The constitutional right to travel from one State to another,
and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
15

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power ...

Commerce ...

among the several States .

. . ."

to regulate

See also Edwards v. California,

314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (holding that a California statute prohibiting the "bringing" or transportation of indigent persons into the state was an unconstitutional
barrier to interstate commerce); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203-04 (1885) (finding that the transportation of passengers
upon ferry boats between states to be a form of interstate commerce).
"6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
'67

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
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interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized.... All have agreed that the
right exists.... We reaffirm it now.'68

There is no question that the right to travel is a well-established and important one which the government must and
should seek to protect.
In addition to its long and well-accepted presence as an
implicit guarantee to Americans, this right is important be-

cause it is one of the few rights that can actually be violated
by private actors. Although cases that have interpreted the
Constitution to guarantee the right have involved "governmental interference with the right of free interstate travel, their
reasoning fully supports the conclusion that the constitutional
right of interstate travel is a right secured against interference
from any source whatever, whether government or private."'6 9 State action, therefore, is not required to invoke governmental protection of citizens whose right to travel has been
violated. 170
Finally, courts have interpreted the right to travel to protect a range of people from a range of regulations. Courts have
invalidated a state law that impeded the free interstate passage of the indigent, 17 ' and a tax on every person leaving the
State by railroad or stagecoach. 71 In Shapiro v. Thompson,

.. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966) (holding that the right
to travel protected "Negroes" from a conspiracy to prevent them from using interstate commerce facilities and instrumentalities.); see also Chief Justice Taney in
Smith v. Turner, Norris v. City of Boston, ("The Passenger Cases"), 48 U.S. 283
(1849) ("For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed,
we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United
States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and
repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
states."); Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) ("right to pass
freely from State to State [is] among the rights and privileges of national citizenship. .. ").
"6 Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.17.

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971). This case involved an
action to recover damages from a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their civil
rights by stopping their cars on public highways and physically attacking them.
The Court held that the "right to interstate travel is constitutionally protected,
does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against
private as well as governmental interference." Id.
171 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
172 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1867).
170 See
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the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a District of Colum-

bia provision that denied welfare assistance to state residents
who had not resided within its jurisdiction for at least a year
before applying for the benefits. ' Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, explained that "[tihis Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of
our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."' 4 Courts
have read the right as a broad one, encompassing more than
simply the right to physically pass from state to state. The
right to travel has evolved to encompass the rights of citizens
to choose where and how to live and travel based on their
needs and desires, not their residency.
2. The Right to an Abortion
The right to obtain an abortion is a newer one in the
nation's history, but one that nevertheless deserves govern7 the Sument protection. In the 1973 decision Roe v. Wade,"'
preme Court extended a right of privacy that had been established by Griswold v. Connecticut' and Eisenstadt v.
Baird17 1 to include a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, a right that the Court recognized as fundamental. 7
As such, states could regulate abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy only by showing a compelling state inter-

'7
'U

394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id. at 629.

,,6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176 381

U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold involved a Connecticut law that forbade the
use of contraceptives. The defendants prosecuted under the law were the director
of a local Planned Parenthood and its medical director. Both were charged with
having counselled married people in the use of contraceptives. The Court, in multiple opinions, held that the Constitution guaranteed the right to marital privacy,
and that the Connecticut law impermissibly infringed on that right. Seven years
later, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), extended that right to privacy to
single people, holding that a Massachusetts statute that permitted distribution of
contraceptives only to married people discriminated against the unmarried and,
thus, was unconstitutional.
1- 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

'78 410 U.S. at 113 (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that all but
criminalized abortion).
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est. 9 During the second trimester, the state could regulate
abortions only to protect the health of the pregnant woman. 8 ° And during the third trimester, after the fetus had become viable, the state could regulate only to protect the health
of the pregnant woman or the fetus."'1 All the way through
the pregnancy, the choice to have an abortion remained with
the woman and could be regulated only for these specific reasons.

Since 1973, the Supreme Court has narrowed its understanding of the right to an abortion. Nevertheless, despite
restrictions on funding, increased requirements for parental
consent and when, where and how abortions can be performed,1 2 current law maintains the central holding of Roe.
Casey v. PlannedParenthoodof S.E. Pa. reaffirmed a woman's
right to choose an abortion before fetal viability, holding that
government can regulate abortion at any time during a
woman's pregnancy as long as the regulation does not "unduly
burden" the woman's right to terminate the pregnancy.'83
Id. at 164.
18 Id.
179

11 Id.

at 164-65.

" The fundamental premise of Roe was reaffirmed in Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), where the Court went out of
its way to reject contentions that it had erred in Roe, asserting that "the right to
privacy, grounded in the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."
Id. at 420. The Court in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), however, held that
a statute requiring parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion did not
unconstitutionally interfere with that minor's right to have an abortion. Moreover,
in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court held that government refusal to
fund medically non-lethal abortions did not impermissibly undermine a woman's
right to an abortion. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court held that
refusal to fund even medically necessary abortions was not unconstitutional. Finally, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517-21 (1989), a plurality of the Court rejected the trimester system set up in Roe, while refusing to
overrule the prior decision. According to Webster, the fundamental right to an
abortion remains up until the fetus becomes viable, at which point, if a state can
show a rational basis for its regulation, such regulation is not unconstitutional. Id.
'83 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). What "undue burden" means remains to be tested.
In Casey, the Court held that only one of the requirements of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act-the spousal notification provision--created an undue burden
on a woman's right to an abortion, and was thus unconstitutional. Id. at 2826-29.
The informed consent requirements, the 24 hour waiting period and parental consent provisions, and the reporting and recordkeeping requirements did not impose
an undue burden. And the medical emergency definition, under which compliance
with all the other requirements would be waived, was deemed sufficiently broad
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The central premise of Roe thus remains: a woman has a fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy. Any government
restriction that interferes with the right to such a degree that
it cannot be exercised creates an undue burden. Logically,
therefore, the government has a strong interest in protecting
against burdens on a woman's right to choose imposed by private groups such as Operation Rescue.
B. Port Authority v. WHAM
Does tying up traffic on a major interstate highway implicate the constitutional right to travel? At first glance, it would
seem to do so: the blockade of the Holland Tunnel would have
limited if not entirely abrogated people's freedom to pass from
New York to New Jersey. Thus their right to interstate travel
was violated. However, the Supreme Court's holdings in
Shapiro v. Thompson"s and United States v. Guest"5 read
the right to travel as encompassing more than simply the right
to pass physically from state to state. The Port Authority's
allegations did not rise to the level of significance envisioned
by the Supreme Court in these cases. Thus, the government
interest in protecting the right to pass through the Holland
Tunnel was not compelling enough to enjoin the planned civil
disobedience.
Plaintiffs in Port Authority v. WHAM did not explicitly
plead that the right to travel was at stake. However, an affidavit attached to the complaint noted that "the Supreme Court
has.., indicated that obstructive conduct which is unreasonable [and] interferes with ingress and egress to a public place
is not entitled to Constitutional protection." 8 ' Moreover, the
memorandum of law in support of plaintiffs order to show
cause claimed that the proposed action "will interfere with
interstate commerce."'87 These allegations implied that the
proposed blockade of the Holland Tunnel impermissibly would
interfere with the constitutional right to travel, thereby implying a strong governmental interest in enjoining the action.
that it did not impose an undue burden. Id. at 2822.
184 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
' 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
1&3 Affidavit of Keith Harris at 4, Port Authority (No. 42950/92).
'8' Memorandum of Law at 2, Port Authority (No. 42950/92).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 1497

However, it is a stretch at best to suggest that an action that
threatened to tie up traffic for an hour was analogous to a conspiracy physically to prevent African-Americans from using
highways,"'8 or to a welfare plan that excluded otherwise eligible beneficiaries based solely on where they live." 9 To conclude otherwise would be to reduce the constitutional right to
travel to little more than a mandate for traffic control. Constitutional rights cannot be rendered so insignificant. Given the
absence of a strong governmental interest in protecting the
right to travel in the Holland Tunnel action, the court should
have recognized the overriding importance of the defendants'
interest in political expression. An injunction, therefore, should
not have been issued.
C. Operation Rescue
1. Right to Travel
In the context of Operation Rescue blockades, on the other
hand, the right to travel was directly and explicitly implicated.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to travel "must
protect persons who enter [a state] seeking the medical services that are available there.""9 In the Operation Rescue cases,
the planned civil disobedience directly threatened the rights of
people entering a state to seek medical services. Thus, the
government interest in protecting that right must outweigh
Operation Rescue's asserted right to political protest, and injunctions have properly issued.
The right to travel across state lines to receive medical
care without interference'91 is analogous to the rights of Afri-

188 Guest, 383 U.S. at 748 n.1. In that case, six named defendants conspired to
"injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Negro citizens" in their "free exercise
and enjoyment" of "the right to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia and
to use highway facilities and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce within
the state of Georgia." Id. at 757. Part of the conspiracy included shooting, beating,
and killing African-Americans. Id. at 748 n.1.
18.Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
198 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973). This case, decided at the same time
as Roe v. Wade, held unconstitutional a statute that imposed severe restrictions on
the availability of abortions.
Implicit in the right to interstate travel is the right to move freely within a
state. Residents who live in New York and who seek access to health care in New
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can-Americans to travel without fear for their lives on the
interstate highways,192 and to the rights of people who have
lived in a state for under a year to collect welfare benefits if
they are otherwise eligible.1 93 In Doe v. Bolton, 9 4 the Supreme Court recognized that access to health care falls under
what Justice Brennan in Shapiro called "our constitutional
concepts of personal liberty" that require "that all citizens be
free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."9 ' Consistent with
this holding, district courts have found Operation Rescue's
clinic blockades to be in violation of the right to travel, noting
that "the undisputed facts establish that defendants' activities
obstruct access to medical facilities to women who have traveled from out-of-state." 96 Moreover, a circuit court considered
findings that
[w]omen referred by out-of-state clinics often travel to New York
City seeking its superior medical services. Patients residing in other

states... sometimes must undergo a two-day procedure for second
trimester abortions .... "[Ulnexpected closure of [a clinic] would be
particularly acute for our out-of-state clients, whose travel, work,
childcare and financial problems would be greater because they
would be more difficult to resolve when some distance from

home." 9"

The court concluded, based on these findings, that the government interest in protecting these clients' right to travel was
very strong and that injunctions were appropriate to safeguard
those rights.

York should also be protected from the interference caused by the Operation Rescue blockades.
1
Guest, 383 U.S. at 745.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618.
I 410 U.S. at 179.
5 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
19 New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1259-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989).
"7 New York State Natl Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d
Cir. 1989) (quoting the testimony of a counselor at one of the clinics).
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2. Right to an Abortion
A second substantive right was implicated in the clinic
blockades-the right to obtain an abortion. In Casey v. Planned
Parenthoodthe Supreme Court afTmed that a woman has the
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.1 9 Any state
regulation that "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path" of a woman seeking to exercise her
fundamental right constitutes an undue burden and is unconstitutional.199 Thus, the government has a strong interest in
protecting her from such interference by private actors such as
Operation Rescue, in order to safeguard a constitutional right.
Accordingly, the question then becomes: did Operation
Rescue's blockades of clinic doors amount to an undue burden?
The Casey Court recognized that requiring a woman to notify
her spouse that she was seeking an abortion constituted an
undue burden."' The Court also has invalidated as unduly
burdensome requirements that both parents be notified of a
minor's intent to have an abortion if there was no opportunity
for a judicial bypass of such notice.2"' Without a doubt, physically denying a woman access to the facility that performs
abortions unduly burdens her right to have an abortion. Operation Rescue's blockades thus clearly infringe on a woman's
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.0 2
198 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
199

Id.

at 2820.

200 Id. at 2829; see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)

(invalidating a spousal consent requirement).
201 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).,
2" The Supreme Court recently held that the "Anti-Klan Act," 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1988), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive groups of people of their
civil rights, is not applicable to Operation Rescue. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 61 U.S.L.W. 4080 (Scalia, Circuit Justice, 1993). The Court reasoned
that by the particular language of that statute, women seeking abortions do not
comprise a class, and thus Operation Rescue did not act with animus against that
class. Id. However, both the President and members of Congress have expressed
their determination to craft legislation offering women and clinics protection from
Operation Rescue's blockades. On the day of Dr. David Gunn's shooting, the White
House released a statement that "[tihe violence against clinics must stop. We
cannot allow violent vigilantes to restrict the rights of American women. No person seeking medical care and no physician providing that care should have to
endure harassment, threats and intimidation." All Things Considered: Abortion
Rights Advocates Call for Federal Protection (National Public Radio, Mar. 11,
1993).
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Operation Rescue's supporters concede that their goal "is
to shame or disturb women seeking abortions so that they
change their minds,"203 and to "make the exercise of that

right [to obtain an abortion] unpleasant."0 4 According to one
of Operation Rescue's leading activists, John Cavanaugh
O'Keefe, "there is no such thing as a disproportionate response
to abortion short of trying to stop it with nuclear weapons."2

5

Operation Rescue succeeded in interfering with women's access
to abortion by impeding access to clinics, intimidating patients,
frightening prospective patients and preventing clinic personnel-nurses, doctors and administrators-from doing their
jobs. In order to safeguard women's right to obtain abortions,
then, as long as the central holdings of Roe v. Wade0 6 and
7 remain intact, the governCasey v. Planned Parenthood..
ment had a strong interest in enjoining Operation Rescue's
clinic blockades."'

In addition, on March 23, 1993, Senator Edward Kennedy and twenty cosponsors introduced the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, which
would effectively reverse Bray by giving women denied access to abortion services
a civil cause of action for injunction and damages. S.636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §
3(E)(1)(A) (1993). It also allows a court to fine offenders up to $15,000 for the first
violation and $25,000 for any subsequent violation. Id. § 3(B). Resting on
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Bill aims "to protect and promote the public health and safety by prohibiting the
use of force, threat of force or physical obstruction to injure, intimidate or interfere with a person seeking to obtain or provide abortion services .

. . ."

Id. § 2B.

Senator David Dinenbergerr from Minnesota, who opposes the Supreme Court
cases upholding a woman's right to abortion, nonetheless supports the legislation.
He explained that it "strikes the right balance between protecting clinic patients
and protecting the legitimate rights of clinic protostors. No one will be jailed for
gathering in front of a clinic, picketing, praying, chanting, shouting, holding signs,
waving banners or sidewalk counseling." But, he said, "I cannot stand here and
condone the harassment, violence and blockades against women and doctors who
are exercising or attempting to exercise their constitutional right, even though I
may disagree with them." Senate Passes Abortion-Clinic Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1993, at A16. The Senate overwhelmingly passed the bill on November
16, 1993, and the House adopted a similar bill two days later. Final action on
both bills is expected early in the 1994 session. Until Congress passes this law,
however, women must rely on the equitable powers of the courts to ensure that
groups such as Operation Rescue do not deprive them of their constitutional rights
to obtain an abortion.
' Ledewitz, supra note 8,at 89.
204Id.

- Paltrow, supra note 106.
o See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
21 See id.
"' A governmental interest in upholding state and federal statutes may also be
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present in the Operation Rescue cases. On the state level, both the Holland Tunnel and Operation Rescue demonstrations violated New York state trespass laws.
See, e.g., Terry v. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1261
n.18 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Defendants have repeatedly blocked the doorways to abortion
facilities in the past, and threaten to block access to plaintiff facilities. A blockade
is an intentional, unlawful act which clearly interferes with plaintiffs' right to
possession of the facility. Damages to the target facility and to the women who
attempt to use the facility are direct consequences of the blockade. Accordingly,
plaintiffs have established the elements of their trespass claim ... and are entitled to summary judgment on that claim."), affd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989). In
addition, however, Operation Rescue's blockades also violated New York's antiharassment statute, which provides, in pertinent part, "A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person ... he
engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.25(5) (McKinney 1988). While both the Holland Tunnel actors and
members of Operation Rescue engaged in behavior that served the "legitimate
purpose" of expressing a political view, Operation Rescue did so with the intent to
interfere with particular people-women seeking abortions and doctors and nurses
performing abortions. The Holland Tunnel blockade certainly had an impact on
drivers and pedestrians and residents of the area, but the defendants' intent was
not to harass those particular people; their intent was simply to blockade the
Tunnel. Their action was targeted at no one in particular, while Operation
Rescue's action was targeted very specifically at a group of people. Thus, Operation Rescue's blockades violated the anti-harassment statute.
Moreover, a bill is pending in the New York State legislature that would
expand the definition of aggravated disorderly conduct to include "not only the
disruption or disturbance of a religious services [sic], but also the obstruction of
access to and exit from a health care facility." A-11895, An Act to Amend the
Penal Law, November 24, 1992. Clearly, if enacted, this amendment would prohibit
Operation Rescue's clinic blockades, implicating another governmental interest in
enjoining such behavior.
Various attempts to prosecute Operation Rescue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1989) have
been successful. See National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994);
Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-57 (3d. Cir.
1989) (affirming application of civil RICO to action of abortion protesters, allowing
damages and attorney's fees under RICO claim and finding that clean hands doctrine would not bar injunctive relief under RICO claim), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901
(1989), on remand, 745 F. Supp. 1082, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (granting injunctive
relief under successful civil RICO claim); see also John Henn & Maria Del Monaco,
Civil Rights and RICO: Stopping Operation Rescue, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 251
(1990); Kelly L. Faglioni, Note, Balancing First Amendment Rights of Abortion
Protestors with the Rights of their "Victims", 48 WASH & LEE L. REv. 347 (1991).
For other possible governmental interests in enjoining Operation Rescue, see
Cadigan, supra note 62, at 893-97. The author suggests that courts "adopt a significant governmental interest, that of protecting clinics form conduct that hinders
medical treatment, as the basis upon which to fashion injunctions that restrict
expressive activity." Id. at 837.
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CONCLUSION

When courts balance the equities and consider public policy interests to determine whether equitable relief is appropriate, no one factor precludes or mandates that they issue an
injunction. Rather, the combination of a threat of imminent
and probable harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy with a showing of a strong governmental interest should tip
the balance in favor of those seeking the injunction against the
asserted interests of those seeking to proceed with the contested behavior. Where, as in Operation Rescue's blockades of
clinics, such showings were made, the civil disobedience at
stake crossed the line from "harmless," nonviolent civil disobedience to behavior that interfered too heavily with the rights of
others. Such interference should outweigh even the very strong
interest of the defendant in going forward with the civil disobedience." 9 Accordingly, injunctions have properly issued
against Operation Rescue. On the other hand, where such
showings were not made and the contested behavior did not
implicate a strong governmental interest, an injunction was
not appropriate. In the case of the Holland Tunnel blockade,
either the harm alleged would have been remedied through an
award of damages, or that harm was merely possible or remote. Further, the governmental interest in preventing the
planned action did not outweigh the defendants' right to political protest. Thus the injunction was neither necessary nor
On December 10, 1989, a coalition of AIDS activists, including members of
WHAM, disrupted a mass in Saint Patrick's cathedral. See, e.g., Jason DeParle,
111 Held in St. Patrick'sAIDS Protest, N.Y. TIIES, Dec. 11, 1989, at B3; Protesters Disrupt Mass by Cardinal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 11, 1989, at 12. On July
14, 1992, a group of pro-choice activists, members of the New York Clinic Defense
Task Force, tried to disrupt a mass at Saint Agnes church by blocking the
3, Mahoney v. New York
church's entrance. Affidavit of Patrick Mahoney, at
Clinic Defense Task Force, 92 Civ. 5277 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The group allegedly
planned to repeat the blockade the following day. Id. 6. Both actions could have
been properly enjoined. Plaintiffs could have shown that a legal remedy would be
inadequate, based on irreparable harm to the churchgoers, both physical and emotional; based on the probability of recurrence; and based on the importance of the
churchgoers' interest in worshipping in peace. Moreover, plaintiffs could have
shown that the threatened harm was imminent and probable. Finally, the government clearly had an interest in protecting the worshippers from the disturbance,
which interfered directly with the First Amendment's Free Establishment clause,
and Freedom of Association guarantee. Thus, injunctions could well have issued,
even against the protesters' right to protest.
2.
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appropriate and should not have issued.
This Note sets out standards to help a court in the task of
balancing equities in seemingly ambiguous situations. The
standards defined reflect not which political protest is worthy
of being heard; rather, they are neutral limiting principles for
employing what all regard as an extraordinary and drastic tool
of equity. Consideration of the limiting principles set out in
this Note becomes even more essential when there is a question of enjoining political protest. Because of Walker's collateral
bar rule, in those cases, courts cannot be too careful as they
weigh the equities of the two sides.
There are arguments that the kind of protest under consideration in these two cases did not rise to the level of significance envisioned by the First Amendment, and that, therefore,
the government interest in preserving a certain quality of life
free from the disruption caused by these demonstrations outweighed the defendants' right to engage in the civil disobedience. However, curtailing the right to protest-even if this
particular brand of protest is not explicitly protected by the
First Amendment-in order to preserve that quality of life is
too dangerous. No one suggests that the protesters should go
unpunished; they should certainly be arrested and serve their
time in jail, pay their fines or both. But only where plaintiffs
can show a specific threat of irreparable injury and a deprivation of important rights of citizens not involved in the protest
should the scales tip in favor of those citizens, against the
asserted freedom of expression interests of the protesters.
Where there is no such showing, the protestors must be allowed to go forward, however unpopular or inconvenient their
action might be, because their right to express themselves
outweighs the inconvenience such expression might cause.
Carolyn Grose

